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Abstract
This Independent Study seeks to understand how political parties create their platforms.
Specifically, this study examines how, when, and why political parties cater to the interests
of interest groups and the electorate regarding immigration policy. Three qualitative case
studies are examined: 1984, 2004, and 2016 party platforms and the corresponding policy
preferences of interest groups and the electorate. Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties
forms the theoretical framework of this study, which claims that parties are likely to cater
to interest groups when political salience is low and parties are likely to cater to the
electorate when political salience is high. Ultimately, I find that Bawn et. al’s theory applies
well to my case studies. This study provides insight into how parties are motivated to
change, especially within the context of immigration.
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I: Introduction
The political party is a fundamental vehicle for political participation in America.
United States public officeholders, from the local level to Congress, are almost exclusively
members of the two major parties. The major parties’ ideologies shape political discourse,
policymaking, and American identity. However, parties’ political ideologies and policy
stances are dynamic—ever changing due to shifts in public opinion, monumental global
events, and party membership, among other factors. This study aims to explain why
political parties shift their positions.
In an attempt to explain what drives political parties to shift their policy stances,
this study examines the influence of interest groups and the electorate on political parties’
policy stances. In accordance with Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties, this study
predicts parties to cater to interest groups when an issue’s political salience is low, but
parties are expected to cater to the electorate’s interests when political salience is high.
This study will be viewed through the lens of immigration policymaking.
Immigration policymaking was chosen out of personal interest given its relevance in
today’s national political landscape.
In Chapter two, the study will present a review of various literatures predominately
concerning theories on political parties, as well as U.S. immigration policy.
Chapter three will present the theoretical model of this study, derived from specific
components of chapter two’s literature. Here, each variable will be identified and
described, along with the hypothesized relationship between the variables.
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Chapter four will construct the methodological framework of this study, explaining
how data will be retrieved for each variable and how the data will be measured and
evaluated.
In chapter five, three case studies are presented. In each case study, a different time
period of American immigration policymaking is presented, then the theoretical and
methodological frameworks from chapters three and four are applied to each case. For
each case study, the theoretical model is analyzed and evaluated for functionality.
Chapter six concludes this study by comparing the theoretical model’s application to
each case study, as well as evaluating the study in general. The evaluation will recommend
considerations for future research.

9

II: Literature Review
Introduction
The following will provide an overview on the literature of four topics, in the
following order: theoretical explanations of political party structure and behavior, the
competing “orders” of race in America, the history of American immigration policy reform,
and American identities and the public’s attitudes toward immigration. Ultimately, this
review will present the theoretical frameworks, as well as any relevant information
concerning American immigration, used in following chapters.
The review will start by discussing theories on political parties, beginning with
Anthony Downs’ median voter theory, since it serves as the basis for alternative theories.
The review will summarize the theories' evaluation of influential actors within and outside
of parties, claims regarding the electorate’s knowledge of and access to information, and
explanations of party polarization.
The evaluation of American “racial orders” will consist solely of King and Smith’s
account, which provides an expansive racial framework for evaluating American
institutions, policy, and political actors. This racial framework will then be applied to
American immigration policy.
In terms of American immigration reform, this review will focus on presenting a
brief historical account of past immigration policy. This historical account will include
involved policy making actors, as well as differentiating between “restrictive” and
“expansive” immigration policy.
The final portion of the review will assess American identity and the public’s
attitudes toward immigration. This section will discuss what traits Americans consider
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fundamental to being a “true” American, as well as how these attitudes reflect their
perceptions about immigration, and ultimately their dispositions on immigration policy.
The Foundation of Political Party Literature: Anthony Downs
In his work, “An Economic Theory of Political Action in Democracy,” Anthony Downs
has established the foundation of the literature on political parties and political party
agenda creation.
Downsian theory is politician-centered, in which individual politicians are viewed as
the main political actors that manufacture political action. In particular, it is centered on
politicians’ private motives, as well as their ensuing social functions. Using the analogous
subject of coal-miners, whose social function would be removing coal from the ground
while privately motivated “by his desire to earn income, not by any desire to benefit
others,” Downs classifies politicians’ social function as proposing government policy while
privately motivated by the income, power, and prestige of being in office (136). Given this
social function and private motive of politicians, Downs hypothesizes that, like “an
entrepreneur selling policies for votes instead of products for money,” “political parties in a
democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes” (137). However, voters, as
the consumers of proposed policy, face their choice while possessing incomplete
knowledge and information regarding the products.
If voters were fully knowledgeable and information was costless, Downs asserts that
voters would choose “strictly as a means of selecting the government most beneficial to
him” (138). In determining which candidate would provide voters with the highest
personal “utility income,” voters would compare factual information regarding their “utility
income” from each party’s past performances, then modify their analyses according to
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estimations for the upcoming term. In anticipation, the government would recognize that
every individual voter was fully knowledgeable, so “each citizen’s preferences would carry
the same weight as every other citizen” (139). In effect, an electorate with perfect
knowledge and access to costless information would motivate candidates to value each
citizen’s vote as equal to every other citizen’s.
Of course, the American electorate is not fully knowledgeable on politics and
information is in fact costly to the average citizen. According to Downs, these
circumstances are “so basic to human life that it influences the structure of almost every
social institution” (139). The consequences of this condition, according to Downs, are
numerous. He focuses on three: the persuasive nature of sharing information, parties’ use
of ideology to attract voters, and citizens’ rational ignorance in the world of politics.
Persuaders—friends, media outlets, campaigns, etc.—target uncertain voters who
“need more facts to establish a clear preference” (139). Without the complete knowledge
and costless access to information, voters may not understand the complex intricacies of
existing and proposed policy, how such policies have or will affect them, or what policies
candidates and parties support. This is a point of entrance for persuaders, who provide
facts, although likely a biased selection, in aims “to produce a decision that aids their own
cause” from uncertain voters (140).
The presence and influence of persuasion within a democracy implies crucial roles
for political actors with significant political clout. Firstly, given that some citizens are
capable of persuading large numbers of voters, “some men are more important than others
politically” (140). This disrupts government’s equal treatment of each citizen under
circumstances of complete knowledge and costless information. Rather, politicians are
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motivated to cater their policy to those who have the capability of persuading the highest
number of voters as possible via financial contribution, media platform, etc.
Second, since government is also burdened by limited access to information and
knowledge – in this case concerning voters’ preferences – it must employ representatives
that specialize in discovering public opinion, as well as persuading public opinion toward
supporting public officials’ policy (140). This extension of government effectively
decentralizes the power of federal government.
Next, persuasion is used in the reverse sense – not by the government, but geared
toward the government. The citizenry, interest groups, and other non-governmental
organizations work to persuade the government “that the policies they stand for – which
are of direct benefit to themselves – are good for and desired by the electorate” (140). In
turn, once politicians and parties commit to a policy, they subsequently work to persuade
the electorate that such policy is “good for and desired by the electorate” (140).
Finally, when persuasion is a valuable tool for both government actors and nongovernment political actors, lobbying becomes highly rational for all involved actors.
Politicians “sell” policy favors in exchange for campaign contributions, favorable editorial
policies, and financial support used for television airtime, propaganda, and campaign
employees – all of which are utilized to maximize votes (141). In exchange, citizens,
advocacy groups, and interest groups receive favorable policy stances from politicians.
Persuasion is vital to Downs’ understanding of politicians’ aim of attracting the maximum
votes under the conditions of limited knowledge and costly information. These
circumstances also shape the way political parties create and advance their ideologies.
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Ideologies are key tools used by political parties to cheapen the cost of information
for the electorate. Since voters do not have sufficient information to comprehend each policy
passed or proposed by politicians, they search for an easier, less arduous way to evaluate
candidates and parties. In response, reflecting the previously mentioned motivation of politicians
to remain in office, Downs insists that parties “invent an ideology in order to attract the votes of
those citizens who wish to cut costs by voting ideologically” (142). Political parties’ creation
and adoption of ideologies also force them to comply with some implications. Firstly, since
voters are unlikely to support “unreliable parties,” Downs holds that political parties are forced
to stand by their ideologies, changing them subtly, but not radically, effectively creating a party
“brand”. Second, in order to ensure voters that parties’ ideologies are practical and meaningful,
parties must act in accordance with their ideologies. Finally, Downs recognizes that parties’
ideologies must distinguish themselves from competing parties, even when appealing to the same
voters’ interests. Otherwise, voters will not be willing to pay the cost of assessing candidates
and choosing between them, since their differences would be unrecognizable.
These implications help explain the movement of parties on the ideological scale. Downs
expands on Harold Hotelling’s spatial model, which places ideologies on a “left to right”
spectrum, decided upon by voters. He explains that parties may shift their ideologies left or
right, up until an opposing party’s position on the spectrum is reached. With the private motive
of winning votes in mind, a party’s ideology will shift toward the most available votes. In the
case of a citizenry that supports ideologies near the moderate middle of the spectrum, Downs
agrees with Hotelling, who claims, “parties in a two-party system inevitably converge on the
center” (142). In this case, a change in party from one election to the next has a minimal effect
on policy change – the electorate is rather close ideologically to either party. However, Downs
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counters that if the two most popular ideological stances amongst the citizenry are near opposite
poles of the spectrum, then the parties will “diverge toward the extremes rather than converge on
the center” (143). In this case, “radical alteration in policy” occurs (143). Furthermore, the
continual election of one party may lead to the revolt of the opposition, while an alteration
between the two parties may result in social chaos “because government policy keeps changing
from one extreme to the other” (143). In the polarized scenario, Downs urges that either
ideological stances must shift, otherwise democracy will be replaced by tyranny in which one
extreme imposes its will upon the other” (143). Voters’ use of shortcuts to gather political
information in a less costly manner may not always guide voters to the “correct” choice –
meaning the choice representing a higher “utility income” – although, Downs ensures that it is
often completely rational for voters to remain politically ignorant.
In order for a voter to rationally become politically knowledgeable, the return for
collecting information must outweigh its costs. The average citizen does absorb some costless
information during their daily lives from the newspaper or radio, but in depth policy information
remains costly in time and energy to access and understand. According to Downs, the return for
becoming politically knowledgeable depends on a voter’s expected gain from voting “correctly”
for the party that would provide him or her with the highest utility, compared to voting
“incorrectly” for any other party (146). However, Downs states, even if a voter does choose the
“correct party,” “unless his vote actually decides the election…he might as well have voted
‘incorrectly’” (146). Given that this is usually the case, Downs sees virtually no marginal return
for becoming a knowledgeable voter. He does cite some instances in which the return seems to
be significant: the election is extremely close, a citizen enjoys being well informed, the citizen
can influence the votes of others and subsequently the election results, the citizen can influence
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the government’s assessment of policy preferences, or if the citizen can influence government
policy as a lobbyist. Of course, these are not the case for most citizens. Yet, the cost of voting is
relatively low, so many can afford to simply vote, albeit often without adequate information to
make the “correct” choice.
Downs lays the groundwork for theoretical expansion with his perception of politicians’
private motivation of “income, power, and prestige,” the electorate’s limited access to
knowledge and costly information, and political parties’ use of ideology to attract voters taking
shortcuts, (137). Many use Downs’ work as the foundation of their explanations of the behavior
of politicians and political parties, especially in creating party ideology and agenda setting.
Alternative Theories
The Roots of Party Ideology
In examining how shifts in party ideology occur, Noel compares the chronology of
congressional action and intellectual political dialogue on the subject of race. He finds that
intellectuals began developing ideological stances on race prior to their ideologies’
implementation in Congressional action. Beginning in 1910, when liberals were split between
pro-black and anti-black supporters, progressive intellectuals were sorting out the foundation for
Congress’s ideological split throughout the following decades. By 1930, liberal pundits had
unified as pro-black, advocating for political and social equality for all, including blacks. In
1950, liberal and conservative pundits had become polarized in regards to foreign policy,
economic, and racial issues (168). Yet, Congress was not nearly as stably polarized on race as
pundits were throughout this half-century progression. Not until the 1960’s did Congressional
voting reflect the ideological contrast that pundits had established thirty years prior.
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The liberal ideology’s adoption of pro-black stances supports the theory that intellectuals
craft ideology, rather than politicians’ and parties’ retrospective ideological rationalizations of
their policy positions, as described by the Downsian model. In this instance, Noel explains that
because the major beneficiaries of progressives’ ideology – blacks and poor whites – were not
politically powerful, it’s clear that intellectuals were not concerned with maximizing votes when
crafting their stances. Why then would coalitions found themselves on such weak voting bases?
Noel is led to conclude, “while ideology does define a coalition, it does not need to build that
coalition solely on the basis of voting blocks” (169). However, Noel does provide some nuance
between his theory and the Downsian model, explaining that although intellectuals are the first to
craft ideological stances, it is “the arguments that best unite the various potential coalition
members that became broadly endorsed” (169). Noel’s work clarifies the process of ideological
shifts in party agenda setting, placing intellectual pundits’ concern with coalition building ahead
of politician and party concern with adopting broadly endorsed ideology.
Asymmetric Party Theory
Grossman and Hopkins present a theory that focuses on the differentiation between the
Democratic and Republican parties in regard to advancing party agendas. Their theory is based
on their analyses of voters’ responses to a survey on party preference and political ideology
sophistication. Their findings lead them to an asymmetrical party theory contending that the two
parties do not mirror each other in internal structures, nor are they made up of symmetrical social
coalitions. In this model, the Democratic Party is found to be “understood as a coalition of social
groups seeking concrete government action,” while the Republicans are rather “an agent of an
ideological movement whose supporters prize doctrinal purity” (119). Regarding party agenda
setting, Grossman and Hopkins find Democrats to discuss more specific policy and marginalized
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groups by logrolling among members representing diverse constituencies. According to them,
Democrats’ focus on various groups and policies creates an “internally conflicted and
disorganized” party structure “due to jostling groups” (129). In contrast, Republicans discuss
broader ideological stances, laden with words like “freedom” and language preferring a “limited
role for the government” (122). Also in contrast with Democrats, Republicans benefit from a
unified party structure surrounding shared policy goals based on ideological purity.
In critique of Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, Hans Noel argues that
their perceived asymmetry is overstated. Rather than identifying the Republican Party as purely
ideological and the Democratic Party as purely concerned with disadvantaged groups, Noel
claims, “both parties have ideologies that serve to reinforce their coalition members’ demands”
(Noel, 2015). Noel mostly critiques Grossman and Hopkins’ methodology, which assessed
voters’ ideological language as sufficient in qualifying their parties’ functionality. For example,
Noel doubts that Republicans’ use of words like “freedom” solely reflects their ideological
priority. Rather, he suggests that “freedom” is used to cater to the interests of their coalition
groups – business and a majority Christian nation. His same critique applies to Democrats’
discussion of specific issues and marginalized groups. To Noel, their language may be groupcentric when they advocate for marginalized populations, but that is because the Democrats’
ideology concerns government intervention to establish egalitarianism. Ultimately, Noel admits
that Grossman and Hopkins have acknowledged an important difference between the two parties,
but Noel asserts that the group-benefit versus ideological language dichotomy that voters use to
describe their parties does not reflect how parties build their coalitions.
“Policy-Demanding Groups”

18
Bawn et al. concedes Downs’ view that politicians can be motivated by material selfinterest, but they also argue that, led by a coalition of various interests, parties can gear
themselves toward achieving any range of agreed upon goals, “from material self-interest to
high-minded idealism” (571). Bawn et al. terms these party coalition groups, “policydemanding groups,” that are made up of numerous political interest groups and activists. These
groups form a mutually accepted policy agenda of both concrete and broader ideological policy
stances, seek politicians who are committed to their program, and work cooperatively to
nominate and elect their candidates. The group’s goal is to ultimately select a candidate whose
“paramount goal is the advancement of the party program” (Bawn et al. 571). Throughout the
coalition-building process, the party creates a “brand” for itself, as Downs discussed as a method
of providing voters with an ideological shortcut. Policy-demanding groups influence parties’
nomination and electoral support of candidates as a tool that motivates politicians to represent
the groups’ interests and stick to the group’s brand. Since a policy-demanding group’s resources
and support (money, expertise, manpower, etc.) can be retracted if a politician is not actively
supporting the group’s interests and brand, politicians must push policy along accordingly, not
according to the voters’ or their own interests – this is central to Bawn et al.’s argument. The
idea of establishing a “party brand” is in accord with Downsian theory, but Bawn et. al differs in
explaining how the brand is created, through complying to interest groups and adjusting to an
“electoral blind spot.”
Knowledge and Information
“Electoral Blind Spot”
In accordance with Downs, Bawn et. al recognizes that the electorate is poorly informed
and unaware of political contexts. In fact, Bawn et. al even concedes that under conditions of
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full knowledge and costless information, parties would resort to the center of the ideological
spectrum, chasing the median voter. However, under realistic conditions of incomplete
knowledge, they provide evidence that even the ordinary, ill-informed voter can recognize
blatant extremism and tends to actively reject it at the polls (577). The point at which voters do
recognize extremism is a focal point of Bawn et. al’s argument concerning how parties agenda
set to satisfy policy-demanding interests, as well as voters.
Candidates who propose policies that voters do not recognize as extreme are said to be
located within the “electoral blind spot” (577). Here, parties are able “to win with candidates
more extreme than swing voters would like if they knew better” (577). This is one way that
parties can advance their interests without solely catering to the median voter.
Symbolic vs. Ideological predispositions
Reinforcing their asymmetrical party theory, Grossman and Hopkins observe
contradictory political preferences within the American electorate. They divide the public’s
political predispositions into two camps: symbolic and operational. Symbolic predispositions
reflect the public’s opinion on broad issues, like the government’s size and power, while
operational predispositions refer to opinions on narrow, specific policy issues (122).
Symbolically, a large majority of the public favors a conservative view in support of a small, less
powerful government with few services. Yet, operationally, the public is found to be
overwhelmingly liberal, possessing leftist views concerning issues like the environment, health,
education, and even crime and welfare (122). Ellis and Stimson argue that these contradictory
preferences are the result of “many citizens simply misunderstand[ing] ideological terminology”
– another example of an electorate that is not politically knowledgeable (123).
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In Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, the state of public knowledge and
opinion has separate circumstances for Democrats and Republicans. For Democrats, this process
means that Democratic politicians “must provide concrete benefits to a diverse set of constituents
without activating public opposition to ‘big government’” (133). For Republicans, these
circumstances mean party members, who’re “constrained by the need to maintain popular appeal
beyond the party base, are vulnerable to charges from within [party] ranks that they’ve have
strayed from principle and must be forced back in line” (133). This challenge can be seen in
Bawn et. al’s description of party coalitions’ ability to revoke resources from a candidate or
office-holder that has “strayed” from representing the coalition’s interests.
Party Polarization
“Electoral Blind Spot”
Party polarization, not to be confused with voter polarization, is one implication of a
growing “electoral blind spot” cited by Bawn et. al. Parties work to nominate and elect
candidates that are extreme enough to advance the party’s interests, yet not extreme enough to be
recognized by the ordinary voter. As the “electoral blind spot” grows, as it does when “political
excitement runs low,” “members of Congress can take extreme positions with little risk of
defeat” (Bawn et. al 578, 2012). Even amid politically salient times, when incumbents are voted
out, they’re replaced with equally as extreme candidates from the opposite end of the spectrum
(Bawn et. al 590, 2012). To the dismay of voters, this “leapfrog representation” has resulted in a
scarcity of centrists in Congress. Not only are legislators more extreme than voters would like,
but those in office are able to ‘”appear moderate, yet enact extremist policy under the veil of
procedural votes that are ‘too obscure for citizens back home to understand’” (Bawn et. al 584,
2012). Yet, Bawn et. al does cite evidence finding that “better-informed electorates favor
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centrists,” but “most voters live in districts in which mass communication about their
Representative is likely to be sparse,” meaning voters lack accessible information and political
knowledge (583).
Asymmetric Polarization
Grossman and Hopkins provide a nuanced view of asymmetrical polarization in
accordance with their asymmetrical party theory. They find that, driven by its concern with
ideological purity, the Republican Party has polarized in a more organized, mobilized way than
the internally conflicted Democratic Party. The Tea Party is used as the contemporary example,
founded by supporters of Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign. Yet, Parker and Barreto note that
the Tea Party “is simply the latest in a series of national right-wing social movements that have
cropped up in America since the nineteenth century,” ensuring that this offshoot of the
Republican Party is not irregular, but rather a continuation of ideological polarization from the
right (Grossman and Hopkins 122, 2015). Grossman and Hopkins do not find a comparable
polarization from the Democratic Party. They explain that this contrast is credited to “the
unequal pressure placed on officeholders by their respective popular bases” (Grossman and
Hopkins 130, 2015). That is, reflecting their desire for ideological purity, Republicans
“consistently voice a desire for their party to become more conservative” (Grossman and
Hopkins 130, 2015). Meanwhile, reflecting their concern for compromise to address various
groups’ interests, “a majority of Democrats prefer that the Democratic Party become more
moderate” (130).
Racial Institutional Orders
King and Smith, in their analysis of the two competing racial coalitions in America, the
“white supremacist order” and the “egalitarian transformative” order, include components of
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both Bawn et. al and Grossman and Hopkins. Their theory focuses not on parties, but rather
“racial institutional orders” consisting of state institutions, political actors, and organizations that
have “adopted racial concepts, commitments, and aims in order to help bind together their
coalitions…and serve the interests of the architects” (King and Smith 75, 2005). Similar to
Bawn et. al’s claim that parties can be controlled by “policy demanders” working toward
anything “from material self-interest to high-minded idealism,” King and Smith describe the
motivation of “racial institutional orders” to be economic, political, “to quiet social anxieties, or
to further ideological goals” (Bawn et. al 571, 2012; King and Smith 75, 2005).
These “racial institutional orders,” like any other coalition, have been “complex and
breakable,” changing in membership in order to remain powerful enough to remain effective
(King and Smith 76, 2005). The competing racial coalitions’ dichotomy is comparable to the
differences in parties described by Grossman and Hopkins.
The “white supremacist order,” referred to contemporarily as the “anti-transformative
order,” resembles the Republican Party in Grossman and Hopkins’ study, focusing on ideological
purity. Although founded on exclusionary anti-black interests surrounding slavery and
segregation, the contemporary “anti-transformative order” aims to “oppose measures explicitly
aimed at reducing racial inequalities,” since such measures may stifle their mission for “greater
equality in the long run” (King and Smith 83, 2005). This negative ideology, focusing on
opposing measures rather than passing them, reflects the “Vote No, Hope Yes” trend in
Republican congressional voting in which Republicans couldn’t risk voting in favor of pragmatic
measures, like raising the debt ceiling, due to their obligation to protect their personal
conservative voting record. The “anti-transformative order,” much like Republicans in
Grossman and Hopkins’ account, is “united by rejection of [direct action to reduce material
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racial inequalities in the near term]” (King and Smith 83, 2005). Similar parallels can be drawn
between the “egalitarian transformative order” and Grossman and Hopkins’ portrayal of the
Democratic Party.
The “egalitarian transformative” order was founded as early as America, built against
monarchy and aristocracy, rejecting slavery (King and Smith 80, 2005). Yet, it was not always
visible, as this order suffers from many of the same problems that Grossman and Hopkins find
the Democratic Party to struggle with – finding a comprehensive, unifying agenda within an
ideology based on multiple groups’ interests. Based on directly imposing measures to reduce
racial inequality, this order’s actors frequently shift their focus and resources between groups and
issues. Although all actors within the order are motivated by reducing racial inequality, they do
not always agree upon specific issues—economic, political, cultural— or which marginalized
groups to focus resources on. Like the Democratic Party’s group-centric structure, the
“egalitarian transformative order” has often lacked unity behind a singular cause. Both racial
orders play integral parts in advancing their agendas within American politics, as well as
solidifying America’s racial identity.
It is worth noting that King and Smith’s theory of racial institutional orders is primarily
included within this literature review as a framework to view politics, history, power, which may
be useful in future studies, especially regarding policymaking.
A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Reform
Literature describes U.S. policy’s attempts at comprehensive immigration reform
throughout the 20th and 21st century as an effort by “strange bedfellow” political coalitions,
whose memberships consist of what are usually considered to be political rivals. Positions on
immigration have even tended to crosscut ideological and partisan lines. This is visible from
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pro-immigration conservatives who “value immigrant labor for national growth and prosperity”
alongside liberals that acknowledge American democracy’s growth via “welcoming new and
diverse immigrants as equal citizens” (Tichenor 42, 2008). Meanwhile, anti-immigration
conservatives support restrictionist policy due to “cultural, national security, and sovereignty
priorities,” while some liberals wish for “greater economic and social justice for the nation’s
least advantaged citizens before extending opportunities to new arrivals” (42). These “strange
bedfellow” coalitions have been dynamic, adjusting alongside ever-changing political contexts,
but their unique makeup have made comprehensive immigration reform difficult to achieve.
Immigration policy has aimed to address two aspects of immigration: the rate of
immigration into the U.S. and the civil and social rights of the immigrants within the U.S.
“Restrictionists” support policies aiming to restrict the rate of immigration and, or, the expansion
of immigrant rights. In opposition, “expansionists” endorse policies that expand the rate of
immigration and, or, immigrant rights. These policies have been advanced with economic,
national security, and, or, cultural concerns in mind.
The earliest U.S. immigration policies, from the 19th century to the mid 20th century,
aimed to control the rate of immigration into the U.S. mostly by implementing national quota
systems. After the Civil War, immigration policies targeted minorities with discriminatory
policy ensuring white supremacy over Asians in the West with policies like the 1882 Chinese
Exclusion Act and The Johnson-Reed 1924 Immigration Act, which enacted a quota system that
“erected formidable barriers to southern and eastern Europeans and reinforced Asian exclusion”
(Tichenor 44, 2008). Strange bedfellow coalitions existed even then, when some African
Americans favored such racial discrimination due to their fear of competition from immigrant
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labor, meanwhile “as far back as the 1920’s the NAACP denounced all such race-based
immigration restrictions as wrongful discrimination” (King and Smith 238, 2011).
Other policies facilitated the importation of immigrants in order to exploit cheap labor.
For example, in 1942, the State Department pleased Southwestern growers and other business
interests when they worked with the Mexican government on the Bracero Program “to facilitate
the importation of Mexican guest workers” to address the labor shortage accompanying World
War I (Tichenor 45, 2008). Organized labor lobbied against agribusiness for reform throughout
the Bracero Program, citing “depressed wages and destroyed working conditions” that
“compromised the ‘security’ of American workers” (Tichenor 46, 2008). As the 1960’s
approached, the civil rights movement pushed the parties’ support toward more welcoming
immigration policies, ending the Bracero Program in 1963 prior to the 1965 Immigration Act’s
termination of the national quota system (King and Smith 238, 2011).
Transitioning from policies centered on national quota systems to those with “priority to
family reunification, immigrants with economic skills, and refugees from political oppression,”
race-based immigration stances became replaced with “color-blind” proposals. (King and Smith
239, 2011). For Republicans, this meant supporting a large increase of immigrants as an
economic stimulus, as well as serving as a “’haven for the oppressed,’ particularly ‘victims of
Communist tyranny’” (King and Smith 238, 2011). Democrats also found an economic value in
increased immigration, but centered their stances on anti-discrimination ideals, hoping “’to
implant a humanitarian and liberal spirit in our nation’s immigration and citizenship policies,
making them more consonant with ‘the rights of man’” (238). By 1968, both parties supported
anti-discriminatory immigration policy, mirroring their acceptance of civil rights bills and ideals.
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After the civil rights movement spurred the elimination of the national quota system in 1965,
immigration reform turned its attention to undocumented immigration, an issue of increased
salience due to a spike in illegal immigration credited to family reunification components of the
1965 Immigration Act.
As illegal immigration became more salient, legislators aimed to address the ensuing
problems with the anti-discriminatory “color-blind” policies that became widely accepted
throughout the 1960’s, focusing on equal rights and opportunity. From this perspective, policy
proposals focused on fears of “a substantial underclass,” in which undocumented immigrants
wouldn’t receive “protection from abuse on the job or from landlords, discrimination, disease, or
crime; they may avoid education for children, and they are unable or reluctant to assert political
or legal rights” (Tichenor 48, 2008). This was visible during the previously mentioned Brasero
Program, when the U.S. agreed “pledged that wages, living conditions, workplace safety, and
medical services would be comparable to those of native workers,” but employers and
administrators played no part in following through (Tichenor 45, 2008). A frequent solution
from legislators was, and continues to be, placing sanctions on employers of undocumented
immigrants.
Again, support for immigration policy crosscut partisan ties, creating strange bedfellow
coalitions. Liberal Democrats worried that undocumented immigrants would “compromise”
labor protections and antipoverty programs, while another faction of the Democrats feared that
such sanctions “would lead to job discrimination against Latinos, Asians, and anyone else who
looked or sounded foreign” (Tichenor 47, 2008). Conservatives were split as well; pro-business
advocates deemed that sanctions were unfair to employers, while pro-sanction conservatives
demanded the restoration of law and order. With gridlock preventing any effective policy
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proposals from gaining traction, drawn out attempts toward comprehensive immigration reform
were fruitless throughout the 1970’s and well into the 1980’s.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was symbolic of the previous
decades’ coalitional gridlock. With “fierce resistance” from business interests, ethnic and civil
rights groups, religious lobbies, immigrant rights organizations, and both the Republican Reagan
administration and House Democrats, legislators lacked the consensus necessary for strong
policymaking (Tichenor 50, 2008). Given the political pressure from all of these groups, IRCA
was only able to enact a “compromised package of watered-down employer sanctions provisions,
legalization for undocumented aliens living in the country since 1982, and a new Seasonal
Agricultural Worker program to appease grower interests” (Tichenor 50, 2008). In terms of
illegal immigration, “IRCA had done virtually nothing to discourage it” (Tichenor 50, 2008).
Yet, legal immigration, with little political opposition, was increased extensively.
As “strange bedfellow” alliances continued to hinder progress on successful immigration
policy, their presence also shaped the variety of immigration policy that was able to pass. King
and Smith compare the alliances on issues of overall immigration levels and their enforcement
with alliances on issues of immigrants’ social and civil rights. They find “strange bedfellow”
alliances more present within the former. Effectively, this finding supports the claim that “rights
restrictionists have had greater success in shaping modern policies than immigration
restrictionists or champions of stringent enforcement policies” (King and Smith 241, 2011). This
was exemplified in immigration policy passed following IRCA in 1986.
In the early 1990’s a number of events sparked anti-immigration sentiments. The
implementation of NAFTA, which promoted Mexican immigration, Islamic immigrants’
bombing of the World Trade Center, and controversy stoked by Haitian and Cuban refugees are
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all cited by King and Smith as salient issues within the 1990’s that led to pressure for antiimmigration policy (King and Smith 245, 2011). Amid pressure to “reduce immigration levels,
deport the undocumented, deny immigrants public benefits, and limit immigrant social and civil
rights generally,” the Republican Party platform aimed to “stop illegal immigration,” and the
Democratic Party stood by their anti-discriminatory platform (King and Smith 245, 2011).
Throughout the 1990’s, various Republicans advanced policy proposals to “expedite deportation
of undocumented immigrants suspected of terrorism,” “deny immigrants access to public
benefits,” “restrict birthright citizenship for children of [short-stay] alien parents,” and “lessen
immigration overall” (King and Smith 245, 2011). Democrats followed the Republicans’ lead
against illegal immigration, “endorsing denials of ‘welfare benefits’ to ‘illegal aliens’” (King and
Smith 245, 2011). In 1996, with overwhelming bipartisan support, substantial policy was passed
in the wake of rights restrictionist consensus from both parties: the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). In all, these policies expedited deportation of “suspected alien
terrorists or criminals,” “made immigrants ineligible for federally funded benefit programs for
five years,” and “increased resources for immigration law enforcement, including detentions”
(King and Smith 246, 2011). Together in an anti-discriminatory coalition, “Black, Hispanic, and
Asian Caucus House members overwhelmingly opposed IIRIRA,” while conservative Democrats
supported it (King and Smith 247, 2011). In reaction to this wave of restrictionist policymaking,
“a new generation of foreign-born voters…have created fresh electoral incentives for national
politicians to guard expansive immigration policies” (Tichenor 58, 2008).
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Since the rights restrictionist movement in the 1990’s, immigration has remained
virtually unchanged. An “anti-terrorist political climate” followed the 9/11 attacks, which
“favored the tougher enforcement views within the governing Republicans,” but employer
interests and a growing Latino voter base stood between substantial policymaking (King and
Smith 248, 2011). Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the Republican platform
“stressed the economic value of immigration, called for immigrants’ ‘cultural integration,’ as
well as improved enforcement including a border fence and ‘sweeping new powers to deport’”
(King and Smith 247, 2011). The Democrats however, supported various methods of obtaining
citizenship, as well as sanctions for employers of undocumented immigrants, while “opposing
worker programs” (King and Smith 247, 2011).
The effectiveness of American immigration policy has long been plagued by “the
inability of Americans to agree on responses to racial inequities,” which has resulted in
incomprehensive reform, unable to address the problem of illegal immigration and favoring
business’s desire for cheap, exploitable labor (King and Smith 249, 2011). Not only have
Americans disagreed on remedies to racial inequities and illegal immigration, but the “strange
bedfellow coalitions” that have made up restrictionist and expansionsist coalitions have limited
policymakers’ ability to assemble effective compromises within a comprehensive piece of
legislation. Yet, as minority and foreign-born populations grow within the U.S., contemporary
policymakers must take into account their generally expansionist preferences.
American Identity and Public Attitudes Toward Immigration
American Identity
As previously mentioned, King and Smith’s “racial institutional orders,” like any other
coalition, have been “complex and breakable” (King and Smith, 2005, 76). These coalitions
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have changed to best benefit the interests of their architects, as well as to remain viable amid
dynamic political contexts. One important component for racial coalitions’ membership and
agendas has been the public’s American identity: attitudes about what it means to be an
American and policy preferences reflective of such attitudes.
Citrin et. al examines American identity in order to understand the public’s attitudes on
issues like public education, immigration, affirmative action, and voting rights, as well as the
rising numbers of Asian and Hispanic minorities (1125). Using symbolic politics theory, based
on the role of symbolic cultural attitudes in political predispositions, Citrin et. al analyzes survey
responses to the question, “what criteria does the mass public use to define American nationality
and what are current attitudes toward the growing number of Hispanic and Asians?” Some of the
traditional qualities of American cultural tradition include “liberal” virtues such as “political
participation, economic individualism, and egalitarian social manners” (Citrin et. al 1130, 1990).
Yet, Citrin et. al also cite “belief in God and competence in English,” as well as “standing up for
one’s country against its critics,” as “ethnocultural” characteristics of a more restrictive
American identity. A wide array of respondents for Citrin et. al’s survey question allows for a
better understanding of what drives American identity.
Consensus is undoubtedly present in Citrin et. al’s findings. Three quarters of their
sample found the more “liberal” characteristics of Americanism, such as “treating people of all
races and backgrounds equally,” to be “very important” in being a “true American” (1130).
“Symbolic” characteristics, like religion or linguistic capabilities, received varying levels of
consensus. In terms of religion, consensus was less present; 64% of strong conservatives and
26% of strong liberals found belief in God to be “very important” in making up a “true
American” (Citrin et. al 1131, 1990). Attitudes on language did resemble consensus; throughout
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respondent groups, English speaking was identified as a “very important” characteristic for
Americanism. Even Hispanic and Asian respondents, although at lower levels than others,
agreed that English speaking is an integral part to what makes someone American (131).
Although Citrin et. al do find a legitimate consensus on a number of characteristics of
Americanism, some groups are less likely to find any symbolic characteristics of Americanism.
Educated and wealthy respondents were much less likely to identify symbolic
characteristics as vital components of being American. According to Citrin et. al, this disparity
between the “elite” and the general public has “the potential for populist outbursts” (1149). For
example, in California, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida, ballot successful ballot initiatives have
made English the states’ official language. Citrin et. al argue that the implications of ideological
tension between the elite and general public may depend on “the salience of ethnic issues,” as
well as immigrants’ ability to assimilate rapidly to American life (1149). Aside from
designating English as the official language, Americanism fuels predispositions on a number of
other policy issue areas.
Americanism’s role in founding policy predispositions is confirmed by Citrin et. al’s
findings concerning affirmative action, public education, and voting rights. Those respondents
identifying symbolic Americanism were found to likely object measures of affirmative action,
“presumably because this violates the principle of equal treatment based on individual merit”
(1143). In public education, Citrin et. al find that respondents widely oppose bilingual education
programs that aim to maintain Hispanic and Asian children’s native tongue. Rather, respondents
favor transitional bilingual education that is ultimately taught in English – unless such a program
would require a tax hike. So, effectively, “the onus of assimilation is placed on the immigrants
themselves” (1143). Lastly, respondents were found to oppose voting rights to those who cannot
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read English. Each of these analyses controlled for partisan allegiance, economic standing, and
social location, leaving Americanism—or the belief in symbolic cultural identity required to be
an American—as the sole independent variable.
American Identity and The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Immigration
Much like the policy issue areas described above, national identity plays a telling role in
shaping the public’s attitudes toward immigration. In their article, Public Attitudes Toward
Immigration, Hainmueller and Hopkins look to explain what motivates the public attitudes of
developed democracies on the subject of immigration. Among other conclusions, they cite two
main patterns: national interest is more influential in forming immigration attitudes than issues of
self-interest, and on a related note, perceptions of immigrants’ effect on symbolic group traits
(often cultural, but sometimes economic) “are powerful correlates of immigration attitudes”
(Hainmueller Hopkins 242, 2014).

Concerning the effect of national issues, they provide the

example of economic stress. Amid personal economic strife, their respondents did not change
their attitudes toward immigration. Yet, amid national economic recession, respondents were
found to shift toward “anti-immigration attitudes” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 231, 2014).
Hainmueller and Hopkins cite a variety of influential examples concerning perceived
effects of immigration on symbolic group traits and well-being, including ethnicity, religion,
language, and although less often than cultural issues, economy. For instance, “Americans who
take an ethnocultural view of national identity,” which Citrin et. al cites as a large portion of the
American public, “are more supportive of restricting immigration” (Hainmueller and Hopkins
235, 2014). The tendency to support restrictionist immigration policy also applies to
“respondents who held more assimilationist conceptions of American identity,” meaning they
expect immigrants to learn English and quickly adapt to American norms, rather than living
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according to the norms of immigrants’ home country. Such assimilationist conceptions are
visible in the respondents of Citren et. al’s survey regarding bilingual education programs. In
contrast, those that hold “civic conceptions of identity,” like the widely accepted values of
political participation and economic individualism referred to in Citrin et. al, “correlate with less
restrictionist attitudes.” This may seem contradictory, since citizens can undoubtedly stand for
both ethnocultural and civic conceptions of national identity, but Hainmueller and Hopkins
explain that public attitudes toward immigration can shift depending on the political context of
the present.
Mass media, stereotypes, and the political salience of national immigration issues are all
factors with the potential to shift the American public’s attitudes toward immigration, according
to Hainmueller and Hopkins. Stereotypes of immigrant groups are often created through the
“portrayals of these groups by parties and the mass media” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 233,
2014). Plus, depending on mass media’s coverage on immigration, it can become a salient issue.
In this case, Hopkins’ research finds, “at times when immigration is nationally salient, living in a
community with a growing immigrant population is associated with more restrictive views. At
other times, there is no such relationship, suggesting a role for national politics in politicizing
local contexts” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 237, 2014). The salience of immigration is reported
to “have the potential to mobilize broad swaths of the electorate,” subsequently; “immigration is
thus an issue with the potential to emerge suddenly and to destabilize political alignments”
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 232, 2014). Given the previously discussed “threats” that publics
perceive immigration to present on their nations and cultures, immigration salience is most
expected to shift public attitudes toward restrictionist immigration preferences, as stated by
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Hainmueller and Hopkins; “when salient, immigration has the potential to mobilize otherwise
left-leaning voters in a right-leaning direction” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 233, 2014).
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III: Theory
Introduction
This study will examine, in terms of immigration policy, the causal relationship between
interest groups’ policy preferences and party platform setting. Based on a review of the
literature, I hypothesize that unless immigration becomes politically salient, interest groups will
have a significant direct influence on shaping party platforms on immigration policy. When
immigration does become salient, however, I would expect for parties’ immigration policy
platforms to cater to the electorate’s immigration interests, not interest groups’. This argument is
presented in the flow diagram below:

Independent Variable

Dependent Variable

Interest Groups’
Immigration Policy
Preferences

Political Parties’
Immigration Policy
Platform

Conditional Variable
Salient Immigration
Issues
Figure 1

Explanation of Variables
Independent Variable: Interest Groups’ Immigration Policy Preferences
In this analysis, the immigration policy preferences of various interest groups will serve
as the independent variable. Specifically, the “restrictive” or “expansive” qualities of the interest
groups’ policy preferences will be identified. “Restrictive” immigration policy simply intends to
restrict the levels of immigration permitted and, or, the civil and social rights of immigrants, for
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example: limiting immigrants’ rights to receiving public benefits, getting jobs, and gaining
citizenship. Expansive policies intend to do the opposite: raise immigration levels, expedite the
naturalization process, facilitate family reunification, and grant asylum to refugees. The interest
groups selected for examination will derive from King and Smith’s competing “racial
institutional orders.”
King and Smith define racial institutional orders to be first an institutional order: “A
coalition of governing state institutions, non-state political institutions, and political actors that is
bound together by broadly similar senses of goals, rules, roles, and boundaries that members of
each order wish to see shaping political life in certain areas” (King and Smith 78, 2005).
Secondly, racial institutional orders “seek and exercise governing power in ways that predictably
shape people’s statuses, resources, and opportunities by their placement in ‘racial’ categories”
(King and Smith 78, 2005). King and Smith identify two main competing racial institutional
orders in America; the “anti-transformative order” aims to reject explicit attempt to reduce racial
inequality, while the “transformative order” aims to enact explicit means to reduce racial
inequality. Both will be taken into account in this study.
Due to the exceptionally broad range of actors within racial institutional orders’
memberships, for practicality’s sake this study will focus solely on interest groups representative
of each respective racial institutional order. Plus, as noted in the following Dependent Variable
section, Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties places particular significance on the influence of
interest groups on political parties.
King and Smith describe “the American state as comprised of multiple institutional
orders, including competing racial orders with conflicting ideologies” (King and Smith 76,
2005). So, given the orders’ conflicting nature, the policy preferences of both racial institutional
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orders, no matter their motivation, ought to conflict to some extent. Since the coalitions that
make up institutional orders are “breakable and complex,” the coalitions’ goals and memberships
will shift throughout various eras of immigration policy reform. In fact, at any given time, an
actor may not be fully dedicated to a racial institutional order across all policy issues.
Although the members within these orders will have distinctive motives for their
membership, whether economic, political, social, or ideological, their collectively shared
immigration policy goals define their identity as a coalition, regardless of their motivation for
membership. That being said, even if the orders’ immigration policy preferences do not
explicitly identify race as an element of their concern, King and Smith assure us that even
“features of American politics that may appear unrelated to race,” for instance “modern
immigration policies,” can be explained by racial institutional orders (King and Smith 78, 2005).
In fact, immigration policy coalitions have been referred to as “strange bedfellow
coalitions” due to their unordinary memberships that consist of what are usually considered
political rivals. These coalitions crosscut partisanship, creating shared policy goals between, for
example, conservatives concerned with national security and liberals desiring justice for
disadvantaged Americans prior to accepting immigrants (Tichenor, 2008). In the case of
immigration policy, despite the rivalry that is usually present between the members of “strange
bedfellow coalitions,” their shared policy preferences form a coalition that can be evaluated
under King and Smith’s theory of racial orders.
Dependent Variable: Political Parties’ Immigration Policy Platform
The immigration policy agendas of both the Republican and Democratic Parties will be
evaluated as the dependent variable in this study. More specifically, the policies’ restrictive or
expansive qualities, as described above, will be measured. This study will analyze the
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relationship between the independent variable (racial institutional orders’ immigration policy
preferences) and the dependent variable (the restrictiveness and expansiveness of party agendas’
immigration policies).
In this study, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is
founded on theories of political parties from Hans Noel and Bawn et. al. Noel’s theory focuses
on parties’ adoption of ideology. He finds that political pundits and intellectuals craft ideologies
without regard for electoral acceptability. These ideologies may take decades to become
electorally viable for political parties to eventually adopt and implement them. Given the history
of American racial institutional orders, Noel’s findings are central to examine the relationship of
this study. For example, King and Smith explain that amidst the “xenophobic and racist
intentions” of the national quota system that was in place from the 1920’s to the 1960’s, the
NAACP acted within the “transformative order,” denouncing the system’s discrimination. Yet,
the “transformative order’s” immigration work did not become visible in party ideology until
1965, when immigration policy reform ousted the quota system, prioritizing family reunification
and the acceptance of refugees from communist rule. This “lag” in parties’ adoption of ideology
will be taken into account when analyzing the relationship between independent and dependent
variables. Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties helps explain why parties adopt ideologies
and, furthermore, when parties must cater to the electorate, rather than the interests of “policy
demanders.”
Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties deems that interest groups and activists, coined
“policy demanders,” are central to parties’ organization. Policy demanders form coalitions “to
capture and use government for their particular goals, which range from material self-interest to
high-minded idealism” (Bawn et. al 571, 2012). These policy demander coalitions influence the
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party to create party agendas and nominate candidates. Policy demanders then support the
party’s candidates through the electoral process with money, expertise, manpower, and other
resources. The coalition’s membership benefits by its ability to “nominate and elect a large
number of legislators—possibly even a majority—committed in advance to a program that
incorporates the group’s goals” (Bawn et. al 576, 2012). In fact, given the minimal level of
political knowledge that Bawn et. al attributes to the electorate, “policy demanding groups” are
able to utilize an “electoral blind spot” to advance their party program in extreme ways that the
electorate would not actually support with a full understanding of the policy. Immigration
policy, however, has not often been an issue of consensus within policy demander coalitions,
causing unusual coalition membership in each party, as well as compromised party positions on
immigration.
Immigration policy “strange bedfellow coalitions” crosscut partisanship, which is a main
reason that efforts toward comprehensive immigration policy reform, no matter the partisan
makeup of Congress, have often fallen short. Yet, Bawn et. al’s theory explains that policy
demanders’ various, often conflicting immigration policy preferences are formed into a singular,
shared party agenda. That is, since policy demanders present opposing preferences concerning
immigration policy, in order to please the most policy demanders, or at least the most supportive,
parties must stand for a platform that adheres to policy demanders’ preferences in some aspect,
while avoiding to neglect opposing policy demanders’ interests. This compromise between
policy demanders’ interests has formed weak versions of immigration policy. This explanation
of party agenda setting, along with Noel’s theory on parties’ adoption of ideology, provide a
framework to examine how racial institutional orders’ immigration policy preferences affect the
eventual adoption of immigration policy stances in party agendas.
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Conditional Variable: The Salience of Immigration
A conditional variable, when present, disrupts the relationship between the independent
and dependent variables. In this case, the conditional variable is an increased salience
surrounding the issue of immigration. For example, national security crises, refugee crises, and
national economic depressions are capable of arousing nativist notions of national identity,
subsequently shifting both political parties’ agendas toward “restrictionist” immigration policy
stances. Such “salient immigration-related threats have the potential to mobilize broad swaths of
the electorate,” which, according to both Downsian median voter theory and Bawn et. al’s
“electoral blind spot,” would expectedly affect the agendas of political parties (Hainmueller and
Hopkins 232, 2014). As previously mentioned, Bawn et. al’s “electoral blind spot” claims that
due to the general electorate’s minimal political knowledge, parties are able to push policy that is
more extreme than the electorate would knowingly accept. Yet, amid an increased salience of
immigration, the “electoral blind spot” would shrink, meaning the electorate would become more
aware and knowledgeable on the issue of immigration and parties’ immigration policy stances.
Consequently, Bawn et. al explains that the parties must act according to Downsian median voter
theory, shifting their policy stances toward an electorally viable position.
When immigration is salient, restrictionist sentiment would most expectedly ignite,
although not always. Shifts toward restrictionist immigration policy amid threats to national
security, the economy, or cultural identity can be explained by King and Smith’s racial
institutional orders, as well as the ethnocultural state of American identity. King and Smith
describe the racial agenda of the “anti-transformative order” as “a negative one,” where “its
actors and institutions oppose measures explicitly aimed at reducing racial inequalities” (King
and Smith 83, 2005). Furthermore, they explain that the “anti-transformative forces” are “more
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united against most changes than egalitarian actors and institutions are united in pushing for any
changes,” effectively meaning “both political parties have incentives not to pursue policies that
whites find threatening too ardently or openly” (King and Smith 84, 2005). Given the literature
on American identity and attitudes toward immigration, threats can range from linguistic
differences to national security.
Citrin et. al find an ethnocultural American identity as existent and widely visible in their
respondents, including notions that Americans ought to speak English, believe in God, and
“stand up for their country amid criticism” (Citrin et. al, 1990). Hainmueller and Hopkins
expand on these findings, claiming that those who hold ethnocultural views of national identity
are more likely to support restrictionist immigration policy (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).
Especially within the realm of immigration policy, increasingly salient political contexts can
mobilize this electorate.
Hainmueller and Hopkins present the idea of “galvanizing effects,” which have the
ability to intensify the attitudes of “those already predisposed to opposed immigration”
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 238, 2014). For example, Republicans with exposure to Spanish
speakers are less likely to support “a pathway to citizenship.” In fact, restrictive policy
advocates have even had success attracting liberal support when “immigration is framed as a
national security threat” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 238, 2014). Clearly, the salience of
immigration-related issues is able to have a significant impact on political opinion toward
immigration, as well as party agenda setting on immigration policy.

42

IV: Methodology
Methodological Approach and Case Study Selection
This study aims to apply Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to understand the
relationship between racial institutional orders and political party agenda setting in terms of
immigration policy. A comparative case study will be implemented on a selection of the major
party agendas after 1964. This time frame has been chosen due to the revolutionary Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965, which reshaped U.S. immigration policymaking contexts. The
specific platforms included in this study will be from the years 1984, 2004, and 2016. These
specific party platforms have been selected due to their place in time, just prior to major
congressional efforts for immigration reform.
This method is most appropriate given that the theoretical model will be applied to
numerous cases in order to answer process questions concerning party platform setting. Plus,
since immigration policy is the subject matter, a limited number of cases are available to
examine within United States immigration policymaking. This study can potentially be
replicated using future cases, as political contexts and immigration policy will provide new
cases.
Independent Variable
The independent variable of this study is the immigration policy preferences of the
opposing racial institutional orders. Since racial institutional orders consist of a vast range of
governing state institutions, non-state political institutions, and political actors, it will be
necessary to isolate a select sample of institutions from each order (King and Smith, 2005). To
evaluate each racial institutional order’s immigration policy stances, this study will identify
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interest groups that consistently represented each orders’ immigration preferences. Then, these
findings will be applied to Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties.
King and Smith cite “neorestrictionist groups,” such as the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA, as interest groups within the “strange bedfellow
coalitions” for reducing both levels of immigration and the rights of immigrants. These groups
will serve as representatives of the anti-transformative racial order.
Numerous resources will provide measurable data for “neorestrictionist groups’”
immigration preferences, including: testimonies from congressional hearings, historical
newspaper articles, and information from interest groups’ own websites and publications.
In the transformative order, “ethnic advocacy groups,” such as the NAACP and the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) were cited as members of
the “strange bedfellow coalition” against reducing immigration and for the full civil and social
rights for immigrants. These organizations will serve as representatives of the transformative
racial order. Similar resources to those used for “neorestrictionist groups” will be used to collect
data concerning “ethnic advocacy groups’” immigration policy preferences.
Using the data collected on both “neorestrictionist groups” and “ethnic advocacy groups,”
each group will be placed on a spectrum, rating their policy preferences’ “restrictiveness” and
“expansiveness.” The spectrum will range from “High Expansive” to “High Restrictive,” with
less extreme distinctions between the two. Those interest groups with policy preferences
consisting of three or more “restrictionist” or “expansive” policies will be designated within the
according “High” classification. Interest groups supporting only one policy will be considered
“Low.” In the event that an interest group supports both “restrictive” and “expansive” policies,
the group’s “net” preference will determine its place on the spectrum. For example, if an interest
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group supports two expansive policies and one restrictive policy, then the group would be
considered “Low Expansive” on the spectrum. Also, it is important to note, that the quality of
policy preferences will be taken into account. For instance, if a policy preference advocates for
extremely restrictive or expansive policy content, it will have a greater net worth,
consequentially influencing its rating.
Immigration Policy Preference
Spectrum

High
Expansive

Low
Expansive

Low
Restrictive

Neutral

High
Restrictive

Figure 2

To measure the restrictiveness or expansiveness of these interest groups’ immigration
policy stances, this study must distinguish what sort of policies are to be considered “restrictive”
or “expansive.
Restrictive Immigration Policy
•
•

•
•
•
•

Decrease immigration levels
Increase militant border
patrol/detention facilities/deportation
efforts
Decrease granting asylum
Limit immigrant access to public
benefits
Limit immigrants’ ability to work/work
for fair wages
Exclude home countries eligible for
emigration to U.S.

Expansive Immigration Policy
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increase immigration levels
Expansion of granting asylum
Allow family reunification in U.S.
Expand immigrant access to public
benefits
Expand immigrants’ ability to
work/work for fair wages
Expand home countries eligible for
emigration to U.S.

Figure 3

In terms of restrictive immigration policies, these will be considered any policies that aim
to decrease the level of immigration, or the social, civil, or political rights of immigrants.
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Specifically, these could be policies aiming to increase border patrol or deportation, decrease
granting asylum, limit immigrant access to public benefits, or eliminate their ability to work for
fair wages.
Expansive policies are considered to work toward increasing levels of immigration or
facilitate the full functionality of social, civil, and political rights of immigrants. Specifically,
expansive policies could come in the form of expanding asylum granting, family reunification,
immigrant access to public benefits and fairly paid work, or eligible countries from which
immigrants may emigrate.
Dependent Variable
To observe the dependent variable, major parties’ agendas regarding immigration policy,
a content analysis will be performed focusing on published party platforms, and presidential
acceptance speeches. This data will come from the University of California Santa Barbara’s
“Presidency Project,” where speech manuscripts and party platforms have been gathered dating
back to the 19th century. These sources will be evaluated by the same standards of immigration
policy “restrictiveness” or “expansiveness” detailed above, evaluating both the qualitative and
quantitative correlations between independent and dependent variables.
Conditional Variable
The conditional variable, an increased salience of immigration, will be measured using
polling data on public opinion. Specifically, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research
created a data set on the topic of the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act. This data surveys public
attitudes about preferred immigration levels, specific immigrant groups, and the criteria for
immigrants’ entry into the U.S. Polls categorizing respondents’ groups (social, demographic,
partisan) will be included when possible. Even more central to the conditional variable will be
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the polls from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research that ask the question, “what do you
think is the most important problem facing this country today?” This survey data will most
accurately identify when immigration becomes salient within the political context.
Specifically, the salience of immigration will be considered present when immigration is
in the top five most important issues identified by respondents in the Roper Center data.
Applying these relationships to Theory
According to Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties, we would expect the identified
interest groups, both from the anti-transformative order and the transformative order, to have
legitimate influence on party agenda setting. This would be a positive relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. That is, Bawn et. al’s theory would expect to see interest
groups working as “policy demanders,” effectively forming coalitions to successfully advance
their interests via the political party. In this case, the result would be visible quantitative and
qualitative correlations between the immigration policy preferences of the interest groups and a
corresponding immigration policy agenda within the political parties.
It is worth noting, however, with Noel’s theory of party ideology in mind, that party
agendas may not reflect policy demanders’ interests immediately. Rather, Noel found that
pundits and political intellectuals initially crafted party ideologies long before parties adopted
them. So, the relationship between interest groups’ immigration policy preferences and political
parties’ immigration policy agendas is expected to potentially exhibit this same delay. This
delay, according to Bawn et. al, would be credited to shifts in the balance of power within policy
demander coalitions. To verify whether interest groups’ delayed influence on party agendas is
due to the dynamics within a party’s policy demander coalition, other “core party groups” will be
compared with the selected interest groups. These “core party groups” represent a significant
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segment of each party’s policy demander coalition, so by comparing their immigration policy
preferences with the selected “ethnic advocacy groups” and “neorestrictionist groups,” each
party demander coalition’s dissension or consensus on immigration policy will clarify.
According to Bawn et. al, if the policy demander coalitions were in agreement on an issue, the
party ought to act relatively responsively to the coalitions’ interests. In the Democratic Party,
large labor organizations’ immigration policy preferences will be evaluated, while the Chamber
of Commerce will represent the Republican Party’s policy demander coalition.
Should it be found that Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties is not evident within this
relationship, then “policy demanders” would not be found to play the central role in party agenda
setting. This would be visible amid a complete lack of interest group and activists’ immigration
policy preferences inclusion within party agendas. Rather, amid a typical political context, party
agendas may solely reflect electorally concerned politicians’ interests.
The relationship between independent and dependent variables ought to endure amid a
somewhat normal political context, but Bawn et. al cites a conditional variable that may interrupt
this relationship: an abnormally salient political context. If immigration were to become an
increasingly salient political issue, Bawn et. al’s theory would expect a shrinking “electoral blind
spot,” within which the general electorate would become increasingly aware of political issues,
policy, and politicians’ decisions. When the electorate is more knowledgeable than usual, Bawn
et. al claims that it notices and rejects extreme policies (which often benefit policy demanders).
Effectively, this means that in order to remain electorally viable, parties must react according to
Downsian theory, shifting their policy stances toward the electorate’s preferences.
Considering the literature on the American public’s attitudes toward immigration, an era
of abnormally salient immigration issues would provoke restrictionist attitudes from the public
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(Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Events like terrorist attacks, refugee crises, or national
economic crises are often capable of increasing the salience of immigration. For example, after
the attacks of September 11th, 2001, national security became a leading priority for the American
public, leading to a spike in those desiring a decrease in immigration levels (Roper Center). It
would therefore be expected for the relationship between the Independent Variable and
Dependent Variable to be disrupted when immigration became a salient issue.
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V: Case Studies
Case #1: Party Platforms of 1984
Narrative
Post 1965: The Rise of Illegal Immigration
In the near-decade following the passage of The Immigration and Nationality Act of
1965, concern grew regarding the ensuing extent of illegal immigration. Although the 1965 act
revolutionized American immigration policy by eliminating the national quota system and
focusing on family reunification, “the new policy perversely encouraged illegal immigration,
especially from Mexico” (King and Smith 239, 2011). Increased illegal immigration resulted
from the act’s inclusion of “a numerical ceiling of 120,000 on annual immigration from the
Western Hemisphere,” along with the scantly obeyed requirement for low-skilled workers to
prove their secured employment prior to achieving legal status (King and Smith 239, 2011). As
“back-door” immigration provided cheap labor to U.S. agricultural employers, Mexico’s
population was growing while its job market was not. Consequentially, five years after the act’s
passage, the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants entering the U.S. doubled (Zolberg
321, 1990). After 1965, lawmakers’ would shift their focus to addressing increasing rates of
illegal immigration, although not without a lengthy bargaining process between legislators,
parties, and interest groups.
Efforts Toward Immigration Policy Reform
Like many previous attempts toward immigration policy reform, a lack of consensus that
crosscut party lines made for arduous legislative bargaining, delaying comprehensive reform
until the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). President Jimmy Carter was the
first President to take action to address the rising rates of illegal immigration; in 1977, he
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proposed a bill to Congress with the foundational components of the eventual 1986 bill.
Although Congress voted against President Carter’s proposal, in response, The Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was created in 1978 “to conduct a
comprehensive study and evaluation of existing laws, policies, and procedures” (Zolberg 322,
1990). Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, then President of the University of Notre Dame and former
Chair of the United States Civil Rights Commission, chaired the commission. Other members
included former Florida Governor Reubin Askew, Director of Criminal Justice Planning for the
city of Los Angeles Rose Ochi, Cuban immigrant and creator of the Labor Council for Latin
American Advancement Joaquin Francisco Otero, former Director of the California Rural Legal
Assistance Justice Cruz Reynoso, various executive department Secretaries, and members of
both Senate and House Judiciary Committees. The commission led to a swift decision in 1980 to
separate the refugee admittance process from the immigration process completely, although
comprehensive immigration policy reform would take years of frustrating compromising to
finalize.
The Simpson-Mazzoli Act
The product of The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was the
Simpson-Mazzoli Act, referring to the bill’s authors: Republican Wyoming Senator Simpson and
Democrat Kentucky Congressman Mazzoli. The package proposal focused on two main
provisions: sanctions directed upon employers of illegal aliens and amnesty for illegal aliens who
had resided in the U.S. for a certain minimum amount of time. These proposals met both strong
support and opposition from various interests. Organized labor and immigration restrictionists
supported employer sanctions, while Hispanics and civil rights advocates cheered the amnesty
proposal. Yet, agricultural employers, especially on the West Coast, opposed the original
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proposal due to their concerns of labor shortages. They called for the inclusion of a guest worker
program to offset the effect that employer sanctions would have on their labor force. However,
ethnic rights advocates adamantly opposed growers’ desire for a guest worker program, citing
the lack of labor and civil rights granted to foreign workers, along with their inability to apply for
permanent residency (Wong 34, 2006). These interests would lobby for years until lawmakers
could compromise the conditions of passable policy.
Success in the Senate, Delay in the House
The Simpson-Mazzoli Act’s first attempt at passage occurred in 1982, when it was
enacted by the Senate, but not the House, where, along with agricultural interests’ dismay
regarding a shrunken labor force, Hispanics and civil rights advocates strongly opposed the
identification requirements within the employer sanction provision (Zolberg 323, 1990). The
House’s inability to pass legislation continued as a trend throughout the bargaining process.
Throughout 1983 and 1984, the House worked toward their second attempt at passage.
Agricultural interests lobbied fervently for the inclusion of a guest workers program — they
were successful. In 1984, the Panetta amendment was added to the House’s version of the bill,
which “liberalized” growers’ ability to “obtain foreign workers on seventy-two hours’ notice”
(Wong 34, 2006). As a liberal Democrat from agricultural California, Congressman Leon
Panetta’s endorsement placed the left’s stamp of approval on the worker’s program, convincing
other Democrats to vote in favor of the bill. In addition, the existing guest worker H-2 program
was “expanded from 40,000 temporary foreign crop-pickers a year to between 300,000 and
500,000” (Zolberg 323, 1990). Of course, organized labor was opposed to such an expansion to
foreign workers, but they “failed to mount a serious campaign against the amendment.” The
Panetta amendment was passed in the House with vast Republican support (138 to 15 in favor)
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and reluctant Democratic support aided by Democrat Congressman Leon Panetta’s endorsement
(90 to 157 against). With the agricultural sector on board, to ensure Democratic and Hispanic
support, the bill’s last amendment “prohibited employers from discriminating against legal aliens
in hiring or recruiting workers” (Zolberg 325, 1990). Just prior to the 1984 Democratic National
Convention, the House’s bill passed 216 to 211: Democrats against 138 to 125, Republicans in
favor 78 to 73 (Pear, 1984).
Conference Committee
Once both the House and Senate versions of Simpson-Mazzoli had passed, the next step
was expected to be “to form a conference committee, which would send its compromise bill back
to each chamber for final approval” (Zolberg 325, 1990). Despite the House’s last minute efforts
to appease Hispanics with anti-discrimination provisions, this plan was obstructed when
Hispanic Democratic delegates’ announced that they planned to boycott the first ballot at the
DNC in protest of Simpson-Mazzoli. Subsequently, uneasy with his ability to win the
nomination without the Hispanic delegation’s support, the Democratic Party’s presidential
nominee, Walter Mondale, referred to Simpson-Mazzoli as “harmful,” spurring “over forty
House Democrats who had voted for the bill to demand the Panetta amendment be dropped.”
This twist threatened the possibility for any compromise or policy advancement, as many
Democrats then stood in opposition to Simpson-Mazzoli.
Still, the Senate and House conferenced after the DNC, unsure if any compromise was
possible after the Democrats’ 1984 denunciation of Simpson-Mazzoli. In order to get Democrats
back on board with any passable legislation, restrictive provisions were diluted in the
conference’s version of the bill: visa availability for citizens’ siblings was expanded and the
Panetta Amendment was dropped in exchange for the House bill’s expansion of the H-2
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Program. Yet, in response to the absence of the Panetta Amendment, “the American Farm
Bureau Federation opposed the bill because it did not meet the needs of producers of perishable
commodities” (Zolberg 326, 1990). And, in contrast to agriculture’s concerns, the AFL-CIO
found the H-2 program expansion far too generous. By the end of the 98th Congressional term,
no compromise was made and comprehensive immigration reform seemed improbable.
Back to Square One
In the 99th Congress, the determined Senator Simpson used his influential role as assistant
majority leader to kick start efforts for immigration reform. Now his third revised edition of the
Senate bill, some initial aspects were tweaked: amnesty would be contingent upon a presidential
committee’s evaluation of immigration law enforcement, employer sanctions became civil, not
criminal punishments, and farmers were given three years to employ undocumented immigrants
prior to the implementation of strict employer sanctions. In response, the bill gained support
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who had opposed earlier versions. Yet, in response to the
diminished amnesty provisions, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) strongly opposed
the bill, while The League of United Latin American Citizens and MALDEF “said they would
oppose the new version even more adamantly than the old,” (Zolberg 327, 1990).
On the Senate floor, agricultural interests’ lobbying appeared to pay-off, as Senator Pete
Wilson (R-California), proposed a guest workers program allowing for 200,000 to 300,000
annual workers. Liberal Democrats, and some Republicans including Simpson were strongly
opposed, citing “greed” as agricultural interests’ motivation for the program (Pear, 1985). With
only 15 Democrats in support of the proposal, the amendment to “establish a guest-worker
program for perishable crops, with an upper limit of 350,000 workers a year” passed 51 to 44
(Zolberg 328, 1990). Then, with 69 for (41 Republicans and 28 Democrats) and 30 against (11
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Republicans and 19 Democrats), the final bill passed in the Senate. Yet, the House was not
nearing passage and compromise continued.
Peter Rodino, Democrat New Jersey Congressman and chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, led the House’s efforts toward a passable bill. In fact, he introduced his own
proposal amid calls to action from reform supporters. The Rodino bill resembled the original
Simpson-Mazzoli, including immediate amnesty without the inclusion of a guest worker
program. Far from agreeing with the Senate bill’s heavy guest-worker provisions, Rodino
delayed compromise until the next year, 1985, allowing for time to prepare for compromise with
agricultural interests.
Compromise in the House
Democrat Brooklyn Congressman Schumer orchestrated the ensuing compromise
between agricultural interests and liberal Democrats, providing the House with momentum
toward passable legislation. With the help of Californian Democrats Panetta and Berman, who
served as excellent liaisons between Democrats and agricultural interests, the Schumer proposal
“was designed to guarantee farmers a ready supply of labor while preventing exploitation of the
foreign workers by providing them with the opportunity to become permanent residents”
(Zolberg 320, 1990). The proposal was met with support from labor and objection from
conservative Republicans against “the ‘giveaway’ of permanent resident status to illegal aliens
who worked just sixty days” (Zolberg 320, 1990). Although the Schumer proposal inched the
House toward passage, House Republicans preferred the Senate’s inclusion of a guest-worker
program to Schumer’s proposals. With only 13 Republicans in support, by a vote of 202 to 180,
“the House defeated a resolution to bring the Schumer’s bill to the floor…the bill was dead”
(Zolberg 332, 1990).
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As the Congressional term neared adjournment, in a desperate attempt for reform, the
Reagan administration urged House Republicans to bring the bill back to the floor in order to
amend the Schumer provisions, although Democrats blocked their effort 235-177 (230
Democrats against and 5 for).
In response, Senate and House supporters worked on compromise off of the floor. The
compromise lengthened the necessary number of workdays necessary for legalization and set a
limit of 350,000 foreign workers to be accepted over a three-year transitional period.
Final Compromise and Passage
In a quick and dramatic turnaround, given the restrictive alterations to the Schumer
proposal’s guest worker provisions, Republicans provided a large enough minority support to
pass the bill in the House (Democrats in support 168 to 61 and 61 Republicans for, 105 against).
Since the Democrats’ opposition to the 1984 House bill, 30 more joined in support, including
five of eleven Hispanic representatives (Zolberg 333, 1990).
The final compromise between the Senate and House again forced compromised between
the existing bills. Regarding employer sanctions, serial offender employers would face criminal
charges, although the General Accounting Office was given the power “to report to Congress on
the effects of sanctions, and if they were found to create severe discrimination or problems for
employers, Congress might reexamine and even repeal this portion of the law” (Zolberg 334,
1990). Also, the House’s generous 1982 deadline for immigrants seeking amnesty was adopted.
However, the provision mandated those applying to spend a year as a “lawful temporary
resident,” then “apply for status as permanent residents if they could demonstrate ‘minimal
understanding of ordinary English’ and a basic knowledge of U.S. history and government”
(Zolberg 335, 1990). In regard to a worker program, the Schumer proposal remained, albeit
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altered; those who worked for at least ninety days in agriculture were eligible for permanent
residency after a two-year period as a “temporary resident.”
In the bills ultimate passage, then referred to as the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA), the house approved 238 to 173 (look up spread) and the Senate approved 63 to 24 (34
Dems for and 8 against, 29 Republicans for and 16 against) (Zolberg 335, 1990).
Interest Groups’ Policy Preferences
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)
FAIR’s stance in support of immigration reform remained steadfast throughout SimpsonMazolli’s bargaining efforts. Most essentially, FAIR supported the employer sanctions provision
of Simpson-Mazzoli, which they referred to as “the heart and soul of any immigration reform
proposal. Without employer sanctions, there can be no immigration reform” (United States 268,
1985). FAIR deemed the 1983 House proposal “a jobs bill,” citing the millions of American
workers who would gain work given undocumented immigrants “displacement” of Americans in
the workforce (718, 1983). Although FAIR thought employer sanctions to initiate progress
toward limiting immigration, they continually urged for additional restrictive provisions
throughout the bargaining process.
All of FAIR’s concerns with proposed legislation were based on their core argument: all
immigration must be limited, including legal and refugee entries. Most broadly, FAIR lobbied
for a cap on all immigration, proposing a ceiling of 425,000, including family re-unification
efforts. Accordingly, FAIR also publicly rejected all forms of amnesty within any proposals,
claiming that the provisions would encourage increased immigration from family members and a
disrespect for law and order, while failing to accomplish long-term goals of controlled
immigration (719, 1983). In response to generous amnesty proposals, FAIR proposed a more
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restrictive version, calling for the eligibility of only “those who have lived in this society
productively for many years,” including a cut-off date in the mid-1970’s.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Throughout the bargaining process, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stood opposed to
Simpson-Mazzoli due to its most fundamental provision: employer sanctions. They argued the
bill would “shift the burden of enforcing the nation’s immigration laws from the Federal
government to the private sector” (344, 1983). Although, the Chamber endorsed Simpson’s third
revision of the Senate’s bill in 1985 as “an improvement,” when employers were relieved of “the
burden of verification” and penalties for employment of undocumented immigrants were
pronounced civil, rather than criminal (Zolberg 327, 1990).
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF)
Although in support of the included amnesty provisions and legalization programs,
MALDEF strongly opposed Simpson-Mazzoli from creation to enactment due to its inclusion of
employer sanctions and guest-worker programs.
Throughout the compromises, MALDEF denounced guest-workers programs due to the
laborers’ lack of civil, political, social, and labor rights. In the 1979 Immigration policy and
procedure hearing before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, a MALDEF representative
referred to “the creation of a temporary resident status group that would not be eligible for any
social welfare benefits was essentially the creation of a working caste in this country” (United
States Commission 8, 1979).
In regard to employer sanctions, MALDEF claimed that the provision would “have a
discriminatory impact on Hispanic and recent immigrants whose physical and/or linguistic
characteristics are associated with undocumented immigrants” (122, 1985).
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
The NAACP took an in between stance throughout the IRCA compromises, supporting
both employer sanctions and amnesty for undocumented immigrants. In respect to employer
sanctions, the NAACP hoped to “improve employment opportunities for the low-skilled who are
most vulnerable to competition from undocumented workers” (Library of Congress 17, 1983).
Given that African-Americans are “disproportionately represented in the ranks of unskilled
workers,” it isn’t surprising that the NAACP sided with labor on this issue. For the same reason,
the NAACP also rejected any expansion of a guest workers program, “as long as there was high
unemployment in the country” (Library of Congress 20, 1983).
However, the NAACP sided with other civil rights groups in support of amnesty.
Alongside the American for Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), among others, the NAACP lobbied for an increasingly
recent date for undocumented immigrants’ eligibility to receive permanent status. Plus, these
groups stood against a 1983 provision of “summary exclusion” that “would have allowed INS
inspectors to immediately exclude, without a hearing, aliens without documentation or a
reasonable basis for legal entry or who were not requesting asylum” (Library of Congress 18).
In fact, then NAACP director Althea Simmons claimed, “summary exclusion strikes the heart of
our democratic system.”
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
The AFL-CIO took a stance similar to the NAACP, supporting employer sanctions to
protect the American worker’s job and wage, but labor rejected guest workers programs that did
not permit eventual permanent residency (Library of Congress 170, 1983). Labor also supported
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legalization efforts that expanded union membership, but urged for cautiousness in increasing
legal immigration until illegal immigration was under control.
Public Opinion
1965-1995 Attitudes Shifted Toward Anti-immigration
Amid the passage of The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, attitudes toward
immigration into the U.S. were positive, even somewhat ambivalent. Then, 33% of the public
called for immigration levels to decrease, 39% called for immigration to remain at the present
level, 7% supported an increase, while 20% had “no opinion” (Gallup).

Yet, as the 1970’s

approached, Americans were faced with a slowing economy and refugee crises from Vietnam
and Cuba, along with an uptick in illegal immigration.

Figure 4: “Immigration.” Gallup.com. http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/Immigration.aspx (March 24, 2017).

Illegal immigration, slow job growth, and multiple refugee crises seemingly shifted
Americans’ immigration views toward the restrictionist camp. From 1965 to 1986, the
population calling for the present level of immigration decreased from 39% to 35%, those calling
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for more immigration remained at 7%, and, most notably, the portion of Americans desiring a
decrease in immigration rose from 33% to 49%, while the 20% of previously undecided

Figure 5: “Immigration.” Gallup.com. http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/Immigration.aspx (March 24, 2017).

respondents dropped to 9%. It is important to note, however, that given the increases in
immigration levels during this 21 year span, those supporting increasing or maintaining
immigration levels in 1986 are inherently more supportive of immigration than those in 1965.
But, immigration was not the issue of any election from ‘72 to ‘84
From 1972 to 1984, exit polls have asked voters, “What do you think is the most
important problem facing this country?” During this timespan, neither immigration, nor illegal
immigration showed in a reported top response. Overshadowed by issues like inflation,
unemployment, and the potential of nuclear war, immigration seemingly took a backseat during
these elections.
Opinion on IRCA versions
In terms of public opinion regarding IRCA, in 1986, following almost a decade of policy
bargaining, the New York Times reported, “the public supported the broad outlines of the
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original Simpson-Mazzoli package but strongly disapproved of guest workers (58 to 36 percent)
(Zolberg 331, 1990). The previously noted increase from 1965 to 1986 in public preference for
decreased immigration supports the claim that the public supported the broad outlines of
Simpson-Mazzoli, which aimed to address high illegal immigration rates.
Regarding race, minorities were much more likely to support generous immigration
policy, as 61% of Hispanic respondents supported an increase or maintenance of immigration
levels. In contrast, only 39% of Whites supported an increased or maintained immigration
levels. Blacks split the difference between Hispanics and Whites—52% supported increased or
maintaining immigration levels—resembling the NAACP’s stance: in favor of decreasing illegal
immigration through employer sanctions in defense of domestic workers while also supporting
legalization programs in the spirit of civil rights advocacy.
Concerning political ideology, nearly half of all Conservatives, Moderates, and Liberals
desired a decrease in immigration levels: 57% of Conservatives, 45% of Moderates, and 48% of
Liberals.
It is also worth noting that all geographic regions of the U.S., other than the Northeast,
supported a decrease in immigration levels.
Party platforms
Democratic Party Platforms
1976 Carter
In 1976, just one year prior to Jimmy Carter’s own proposed immigration reform that
spurred the creation of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, the
Democratic Party platform continued its “anti-discriminatory” stance that it contended amid the
1965 immigration reform, vaguely supporting inclusionary legal immigration from all corners of
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the globe. However the 1976 platform’s discussion on immigration is brief. Besides
encouraging the welcome of political prisoners from other corrupt nations, little is mentioned
regarding immigration. The immigration reform that is mentioned is framed within the “Civil
and Political Rights” portion, where the platform calls for one of the fundamental aspects of
Simpson-Mazzoli: a legalization program “to facilitate acquisition of citizenship by Resident
Aliens.”
1980 Carter
Amid the refugee crises from Vietnam, Cuba, and Haiti, the 1980 Democratic Party
platform thoroughly recognized the Carter administration’s progress in addressing the crises.
For instance, the Refugee Act of 1980 differentiated the refugee and immigration processes, and
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy had been created to evaluate United
States’ immigration policy.
In regard to immigration policy, the platform urged for reform that protected the rights of
undocumented immigrants and minorities who may be discriminated against due to
“neighborhood sweeps” or “stop and search procedures without probable cause.” In addition, the
platform denounced any guest-workers program that would “undercut U.S. wages and working
conditions…which would re-establish the bracero program of the past.” However, an explicit
mention of a legalization program for “resident aliens,” as seen in the 1976 Democratic Party
platform, did not appear in the 1980 platform. Rather, a less specific acknowledgement assured
that the U.S. “must work to resolve the issue of undocumented residents in a fair and humane
way.”
1984 Mondale
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Immigration policy reform had become more relevant and plausible by 1984, when
sensitive congressional compromise continued over Simpson-Mazzoli. At the 1984 Democratic
Convention the Hispanic Democratic Delegation protested Simpson-Mazzoli’s discriminating
provisions by threatening to boycott voting on the first ballot for a Presidential candidate.
The 1984 Democratic Party platform was very brief in discussing immigration reform. In
fact, behind only the 1980 Democratic Party platform, the 1984 platform was the longest in the
Party’s history, yet it included only a couple sentences concerning immigration. Most of the
platform discussed the economy and creating jobs during a period of a globalizing economy.
The portion that did refer to immigration stuck to the Democrats’ status quo: support for
accepting political prisoners as refugees and the denouncement of discrimination amid increased
immigration.
The explicit 1976 platform proposal of granting citizenship to “resident aliens” does not
reappear in the 1984 platform. In fact, the 1984 platform merely acknowledges the
discrimination that immigrants face, but does not mention a solution for undocumented
immigrants residing in the U.S.
Republican Party Platforms
1976 Ford
The 1976 Republican Party platform failed to mention immigration at all. Rather, the
platform focused on traditional Republican issues, including “taxes and government spending,”
“small business,” “a small and just society,” “the American family,” and “welfare reform,”
among others.
1980 Reagan
In 1980, like the Democratic Party platform, the Republican Party’s platform touched on
the refugee crises, citing America’s open arms and the coordination that ought to occur with
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international organizations and governments to solve the refugee crises. The platform does
allude to the need for immigration policy reform that “reflects the interests of our national
security and economic well-being,” although the provisions that would do so remain vague. The
platform does allude to an increased dedication to enforcing immigration law, stating,
“Government has a duty to adopt immigration laws and follow enforcement procedures which
will fairly and effectively implement the immigration policy desired by the American people.”
1984 Reagan
The 1984 Republican Party platform was more straightforward than in 1980. It directly
identified illegal immigration as a problem, urging for “responsible reforms of our immigration
laws…to enable us to regain control of our borders.” The platform does, however, support
family reunification.
Case Analysis
Interest Group Analysis
FAIR
FAIR rates “highly restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. It called
for strict employer sanctions, disapproved of legalization programs, and proposed a 425,000
annual cap on immigration that included family reunification and refugee acceptance.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates as “low expansive” on the immigration policy
preference spectrum. The Chamber was strongly opposed to employer sanctions, but did support
guest-worker programs.
MALDEF
MALDEF rates “highly expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. The
organization stood firmly against employer sanctions’ and guest worker programs’ potentials for
discrimination, and supported legalization and family reunification programs.
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NAACP
The NAACP rates as “low restrictive,” supporting employer sanctions in support of the
black domestic worker. In the same nature, the NAACP stood opposed to guest worker
programs, but did support legalization programs.
AFL-CIO
The AFL-CIO rates as “low restrictive,” mirroring the NAACP’s support of domestic
labor. Like the NAACP, the AFL-CIO supported employer sanctions and legalization programs,
but opposed proposed guest workers programs.
1984 Party Platform Analysis
Democratic Party
The Democratic Party platform rates “low expansive” on the immigration policy
preference spectrum. The platform makes little concrete proposals, but does acknowledge
increased discrimination against immigrants.
Republican Party
The Republican Party platform rates “low restrictive” on the immigration policy
preference spectrum. Like the Democratic Party platform, this platform fails to propose concrete
policy. Yet, it calls to “regain control of the border,” implying increased efforts toward
immigration law enforcement, effectively restricting overall immigration levels.
Public Opinion Analysis
Although the public did seemingly become more aware of immigration as an issue
(“undecided” respondents to immigration preference surveys decreased from 20% to 9% from
1965 to 1986), for this study’s purposes, immigration is still not considered salient in the 1984
election. Since immigration was not viewed as one of the primary, or even secondary “issues
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facing the nation” prior to and during the 1984 election, this study will not consider immigration
as nationally salient.
Case Conclusion
In this study’s theoretical model, the relationship between the independent variable
(interest groups’ immigration policy preferences) and the dependent variable (political party
platforms) depends on immigration’s salience. In 1984, immigration was not salient, so we
would expect for the parties to remain loyal to interest groups, not exclusively the electorate.
This case fits somewhat well into Bawn et. al’s theory, which predicts political parties’
loyalty to interest groups, especially when political salience is low. However, given the “strange
bedfellow” coalitions that dominate immigration policy bargaining, parties can’t always take a
stance that pleases all of their core interest groups. For example, MALDEF and the NAACP, as
ethnic advocacy groups, usually take similar policy stances. However, in regard to IRCA
proposals, the NAACP’s support for employer sanctions’ protection of domestic black labor
contrasts with MALDEF’s vehement objection to sanctions’ discriminatory potential. In effect,
the Democratic Party struggles to please both ethnic advocacy groups and labor advocates.
Resembling the same “strange bedfellow” dynamic, liberals and conservatives are often split
between expansive and restrictive immigration policy preferences.
Both Republican and Democratic Parties faced the dilemma of appealing to both sides of
their interest groups, as well as their electorates. For Republicans, business, represented by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in this study, preferred somewhat expansive immigration policy,
firmly in opposition to employer sanctions. Yet, FAIR argues that employer sanctions are the
bedrock of any immigration policy reform. For the Republican Party, this split meant remaining
somewhat neutral on immigration, pleasing FAIR’s restrictive interests by calling for increased
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enforcement of immigration law, but failing to mention employer sanctions in an effort to
appease the business community.
For Democrats, labor-oriented interest groups, like the AFL-CIO and the NAACP,
favored employer sanctions’ protection of American jobs. Yet, MALDEF, one of the most
visible opponents to Simpson-Mazzoli, opposed employer sanctions due to their discriminatory
potential. In response, the Democrats also took a neutral, almost non-stance. Their platform did
not call for immigration reform of any kind, although it did acknowledge the prevalence of
discrimination amid increasing immigration levels. This position could be interpreted as a
defense of MALDEF’s discrimination concerns. Unhappy with the Simpson-Mazzoli proposals
of employer sanctions and guest worker programs, the Democratic Party simply decided against
even mentioning past or future attempts of immigration policy reform.
Bawn et. al cannot explain the Democratic Party platform’s failure to mention
legalization provisions, which were supported by labor and all ethnic advocacy groups, including
the NAACP. The only explanation within Bawn et. al’s framework is that the Democrats were
so opposed to Simpson-Mazzoli proposals that even alluding to its progress or provisions would
undermine MALDEF’s concern with its discriminatory nature. Democrats do not appear to be
catering to their electorate’s interests before interest groups’: by 1986, almost 50% of liberals
desired a decrease in immigration.
Case #2: 2004 Party Platforms and 2006-2007 Immigration Reform
Narrative
Immigration since 1986
Since the 1986 passage of IRCA, some minor immigration legislation was passed
throughout the 1990’s, but efforts toward comprehensive policy reform had not been made by
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2004. The 1990’s legislation included the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which “affected immigrant eligibility for federal social programs,
increased enforcement efforts, and added [employer] penalties and increased work place
screenings” (Leal 2, 2009). Yet, in the 2000’s, the same illegal immigration concerns from the
1980’s remained, especially concerning the millions of undocumented immigrants already
residing in the U.S. The number of undocumented immigrants residing in the United States rose
from 3.2 million in 1986 to approximately 12 million in 2007 (Wasem, 2012).

Figure 6: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 - Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.”
procon.org. http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017).

Only a few months into his first term, in July, 2001, President George W. Bush
foreshadowed his intentions to engage in comprehensive immigration reform efforts, claiming,
The White House “was considering a task force proposal to allow the estimated 3 million
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Mexicans living illegally in the United States to achieve permanent legal residence through a
guest-worker program” (Wallace, 2001). Although admittedly interested in some sort of
permanent residence program that avoided deportation provisions, Bush ensured to clarify that
he was opposed to a “blanket amnesty” program. 9/11 and the Iraq War would later delay any
federal efforts toward addressing immigration reform, although the programs that the Bush
administration alluded to foreshadowed the bargaining stalemate that would occur throughout
Bush’s second term.
Initial proposals
After the 2004 elections, Republicans controlled the Senate, House, and Presidency.
However, throughout their term in control, divisions within the Republican Party stalled
immigration reform efforts. In the House, Republicans most sought enhanced border security, as
well as the inclusion of a guest workers program. The Senate agreed, although they urged for a
legalization program as well. Yet, the Republican divisions that thwarted policy progress were
not between the two chambers, but rather between “the business community and grassroots
social conservatives” (Leal 3, 2009).
As in the past, the business community pushed for cheap, accessible immigrant labor,
especially in the agricultural sector. To protect their interests, business lobbied for an extensive
guest-worker program and policy provisions that allowed undocumented immigrants already
residing in the U.S. to remain. Social conservatives were more concerned with the integrity and
enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and the preservation of traditional American culture.
They perceived undocumented immigrants to be criminals and policies permitting their
employment, residence, or eventual citizenship were undermining the law and threatening
American culture and national security.
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The first proposed legislation came from the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee,
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI). This bill included severe restrictive provisions, including the
criminalization of “illegal presence” in the U.S., which constituted a 366-day jail term. The bill
also mandated employers’ usage of a “Basic Pilot” program to verify employees’ legal statuses,
and criminalized anyone “offering services or assistance to illegal immigrants, ” which Hillary
Clinton then claimed would send “even Jesus himself” to prison (Leal 3, 2009). The bill met
passionate opposition from immigrants and college students, who protested the bill’s restrictive
nature.
Having desired a less restrictive, more comprehensive reform, the Senate’s proposals
contrasted from the House’s. Three proposals were presented to the Senate in 2006 prior to an
eventual compromise: one from Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Arlen Specter (R-PA),
another from Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ), and one from Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) (Leal 4, 2009). Frist’s bill mirrored the House’s enforcement
heavy proposal, excluding guest worker or legalization programs. He warned Specter, Kennedy,
and McCain that if they couldn’t come to a compromise on their less restrictive proposals, then
only his bill would be brought to the Senate floor.

Frist’s pressure motivated compromise

between the Senators, who then needed a supermajority of the Senate’s support to pass their
compromise.
The Judiciary Committee’s compromise was passed 12-6; “all eight Democrats and four
of the ten Republicans voted yes” (Leal 5, 2009). It included a guest worker program admitting
400,000 annually, Green Card eligibility for agricultural workers, increased border enforcement
measures, and possible legalization for immigrants who had arrived prior to 2004 and had
completed 11 years of arduous assimilation steps, including learning English. The most
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contentious provision was the legalization program, which opposing Republicans deemed
“amnesty.” Ultimately, the compromise couldn’t attract enough Republican support in the
Senate.
Striving to achieve support for comprehensive reform, Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and
Mel Martinez (R-FL) added heavily stringent components to the legalization program in hopes of
attracting Republican support. One provision required those who had resided in the United
States for between five and two years (about three million)…would have had to return to their
nations of origin before applying for a visa,” while those who had resided in the U.S. for less
than two years would have been deported (Leal 5, 2009). However, adequate support did not
present itself in the Senate.
With encouragement from the Bush administration to reach comprehensive immigration
reform, Frist and Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) tweaked the Hagel-Martinez
compromise, passing the Senate 62-36 (22 Republicans for and 32 against, 39 Democrats for and
4 against) on May 24th (United States Senate). Despite the Senate’s ability to pass a
comprehensive reform bill, the House’s restrictive policy preferences made a conference
committee’s potential seem bleak—it never happened. The majority-Republican House elected
to host hearings on immigration reform rather than appoint compromise conferees, killing reform
effort’s momentum. As mid-term elections approached and the potential for compromise
dwindled away, “Senate Democrats charged that House Republicans wanted to use immigration
as a campaign issue and were not serious about finding solutions” (Leal 6, 2009). Yet, members
of both the House and Senate hoped to exemplify their concern with the problem of illegal
immigration—especially before the midterm elections—leading to The Border Security First
Act.
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As the only immigration bill to pass in 2006, The Border Security First Act did not
accomplish comprehensive immigration reform. Rather, it enacted the construction of 700 miles
of fencing on the US-Mexico border. The bill passed easily in both chambers with unified
Republican support and divided Democratic support: 283-138 in the House (Democrats against
64-131 and Republicans for 219-6), 80-19 in the Senate (26 Democrats for, 56 Republicans for).
Democrats Gain Control in 2006
After the Republican-controlled congress failed to pass comprehensive immigration
reform from 2004 to 2006, the potential for comprehensive reform resurfaced as Democrats took
control of the House and Senate in the 2006 midterm election. With trouble, the Senate was the
first to attempt passing a compromise.
The Senate’s proposal featured a mix of restrictive and expansive provisions, but was
ultimately more expansive than the Frist-Reid bill. The most expansive provision was unseen in
past bargaining efforts; the Z visa “would legalize almost all unauthorized immigrants” (Leal 7,
2009). Although, the Z visa relied on the inclusion of several restrictive provisions: criminal
liability for employers of the undocumented, employers’ use of the “Basic Pilot” employee
screening system, no citizenship for guest workers, and restrictive family reunification processes.
The first Senate proposal was unable to gain enough support for passage, leading to the inclusion
of a provision “to commit $4.4 billion for security and enforcement efforts” (Leal 7, 1990).
In June of 2007, after numerous attempts at compromise and revision, the Senate’s
compromise failed to pass cloture, needing 60 votes, but receiving only 46 (Democrats 16
against, 37 Republicans against). Lacking support derived from Republicans’ concern about
appearing inconsistent if they switched their votes from “no” in 2006 to “yes” in 2007, their fear
of a Democrat-led compromise committee with the House, and their rejection of the Z visa’s
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generous citizenship provision (Leal 7, 2009). This legislative failure ultimately killed the Bush
administration’s hopes for comprehensive reform.
Public Opinion
The National Attitude Toward Immigration Levels
In general, the national attitude toward immigration in 2004 resembles that of 1986. The
nation was approximately split in half between those supporting present or increased levels and
those supporting decreased levels of immigration. In 1986, 35% of respondents desired the
maintenance of the present immigration levels, 7% hoped for an increase, and 49% wanted a
decrease, while 9% held no opinion. In 2004, 33% supported the present level, 14% an increased
level, and 49% a decreased level, while 4% had no opinion. Although the national attitudes
toward immigration seem virtually identical between 1986 and 2004 responses, they did not
remain completely stable across their near two-decade gap.
Between 1986 and 2004, national attitudes toward immigration shifted toward restrictive
positions during the 1990’s. In 1995, 27% of respondents supported the present level of
immigration (down 8% from ’86), 7% desired an increase (same as ’86), and 62% preferred a
decrease (up 13% from ’86), while 4% did not hold an opinion. The enforcement-heavy policies
passed throughout the 1990’s, predominately under Bill Clinton, echoed this shift toward
restrictive immigration preferences. Yet, by the 2000’s, attitudes toward immigration rebounded
toward the less restrictive 1986 positions; in June of 2001 those preferring the present
immigration level (42%) actually out numbered those in favor of decreased levels (41%), while
14% favored increased levels.
The 9/11 attacks halted and reversed this shift toward expansive immigration attitudes.
From June 2001 to October 2001, respondents’ attitudes abruptly shifted toward restrictive
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positions; those supporting present immigration levels fell by 12% to 30%, those for increased
immigration fell by 6% to 8% and those seeking decreased levels grew by 17% to 58%. In the
decade following 9/11, attitudes would gradually return to pre-9/11 levels, resembling those of
1986.

Figure 7: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 - Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.”
procon.org. http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017).
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Although the nation’s public was essentially split on immigration level preferences in
2004, it achieved consensus concerning illegal immigration: it was a problem in need of a
solution. In 2006, 81% characterized illegal immigration as “out of control” (Connelly, 2006).
However, the public was very divided in opinion regarding workable solutions to illegal
immigration’s spike.
The American public’s policy preferences split concerning how reform generally ought to
address the approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S.: 32%
preferred allowing permanent residency, 32% preferred allowing residency under a guest worker
program, and 27% preferred deportation to undocumented immigrants’ home countries (Ilias et.
al 745, 2008).
Talk Radio
Although the nation as a whole agreed that illegal immigration was a problem that needed
to be solved, it became a higher priority than most for far-right social conservatives. This subset
of voters’ prioritization of suppressing illegal immigration is evident in the rise of conservative
talk radio.
In regard to illegal immigration, conservative talk radio took an extremely restrictive
stance, even “denouncing Republican President George W. Bush’s work-permit proposals as
‘amnesty for law-breakers’” (Leal 9, 2009). In 2008, discussing the illegal immigrations’
negative effects made up a significant portion of talk radio’s content: 19% of airtime compared
to mainstream media’s 9%. Those discussions “directed intensity toward members of both
parties,” expressing their outrage with the “’’invasion’ of foreigners flooding across ‘porous’ US
border in flagrant violation of the law” (Leal 9, 2009). Given the intensity and frequency of talk
radio’s illegal immigration coverage compared to the mainstream media’s, it is no surprise that
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reform opponents tied their votes closely with their views on immigration; “a CNN poll found
that 43 per cent of reform opponents said the immigration issue would be ‘very important’ to
their vote in 2006, the corresponding figure for reform supporters was 24 per cent” (Leal 9,
2009).
Conservative talk radio, its listeners, and legislators responding to their restrictive policy
preferences are credited for preventing comprehensive immigration reform. Talk radio became
“an advocacy machine…that long buttressed Republican efforts to defeat Democrats and their
policies” (Leal 9, 2009). In the case of immigration reform, this advocacy machine’s efforts also
directed pressure toward moderate Republicans willing to compromise with Democrats.
The Nation’s Most Important Problems
From 1996 to 2004, exit polls asked voters, “What do you think is the most important
problem facing this country?” During this timespan, neither immigration, nor illegal
immigration appeared in the top five reported responses. Overshadowed by issues like the war in
Iraq, crime, the economy, gas prices, and unemployment, immigration did not take center stage
leading up to these presidential elections.
Interest Group Policy Preferences
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)
Due to their stern opposition to amnesty, FAIR criticized comprehensive immigration
reform efforts throughout 2006 and 2007. Aside from pathways to citizenship, which FAIR
undoubtedly opposed as “amnesty,” the group was also dismayed with the idea of a guest
workers program, especially one allowing permanent residency or applications for citizenship.
FAIR argued that guest workers programs were only beneficial due to the cheap, exploitable
labor they provided for American business, but “once immigrants receive permanent residence,
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they can’t be exploited as readily as illegal immigrants.” Furthermore, for FAIR, such a guest
worker program would invite illegal immigrants, which FAIR identified as the source of
“enormous, incalculable costs imposed on society at large—public education, emergency
medical care, housing assistance, housing itself and criminal justice costs” (Katel, 2005).
Foreshadowing the congressional gridlock that would plague comprehensive immigration
reform efforts, especially within the Republican Party, FAIR ensured that their policy
preferences reflected those of “the average American voter” (Katel, 2005). Then President of
FAIR, Dan Stein framed the debate between “elites, major financial interests and global
economic forces arrayed against the average American voter, warning, “the depth of anger
should not be underestimated” (Katel, 2005). These remarks are telling given many far right
Republicans’ hesitancy to support any immigration reform with provisions resembling amnesty.
FAIR’s place in the Republican Party’s base has not always been central, but as illegal
immigration became an increasingly important issue for far-right social conservatives, FAIR’s
perspectives became more foundational in Republican policy stances.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce backed comprehensive immigration reform efforts,
especially those proposing “the expansion of temporary visa programs for essential workers,
while ensuring that temporary workers would not take jobs being filled by U.S. citizens”
(Rosenblum, 2007). The Chamber of Commerce was concerned with any increased bureaucracy
at borders that would “impede the movement of legitimate cargo and travelers” (Rosenblum,
2007).
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF)
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MALDEF supported comprehensive immigration reform efforts, lobbying for a
pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S., permanent
residency for participants in temporary guest workers programs, family reunification,
immigrants’ due process rights, and the DREAM Act, which proposed to grant citizenship to
children who were brought illegally to America if they completed two years of college or
military service. Although, MALDEF did oppose increased border patrol that was included
throughout comprehensive reform efforts, claiming, “the continuous buildup of forces along
the border has done little to curb unlawful immigration” (United States, 2007).
AFL-CIO

The AFL-CIO opposed comprehensive reform efforts that proposed increased
temporary guest workers programs, claiming “workers here on a temporary basis are more
vulnerable to labor violations…some temporary workers will stay in this country illegally
rather than go home when their visa expires” (Rosenblum, 2007). Although hesitant to
support a guest workers program due to the potential to undercut domestic laborers, at
minimum, the AFL-CIO desired guaranteed permanent residency or a path to citizenship for
guest workers.
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
The NAACP stood somewhere between MALDEF and the AFL-CIO, siding with
MALDEF as a civil rights organization and with the AFL-CIO as an advocate for black
domestic labor. Though, in the debate on immigration, the NAACP stood alongside
MALDEF as fellow members of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), a
coalition of civil rights organizations. The LCCR submitted a detailed explanation of the
“complicated relationship between the African-American community and immigrant
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communities” to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security, and International Law (United States, 2007). The explanation detailed LCCR’s
concern with immigration’s effect on African-Americans’ employment levels, especially in
unskilled positions. Yet, LCCR also notes that although advocates of restrictive immigration
policy often claim to protect the African-American laborer, the same advocates of restrictive
immigration policy “inconsistently show their concern for the welfare of African American
on the whole,” citing their opposition to the Voting Rights Act’s reauthorization. In fact,
LCCR states, “it is clear that immigration restrictionists are not—and never have been—our
friends” (United States, 2007).
Ultimately, the NAACP sides with MALDEF more than the AFL-CIO, standing with
the LCCR’s support for “more open vacancy notification systems…to fill low-wage jobs,”
while ensuring “strong labor, health, wage and safety protections, and there must be an
opportunity for such workers to become legal permanent residents and get on a path to
citizenship” (United States, 2007).
Party Platforms
Democrats
1996 Clinton
In response to concerns over illegal immigration, the 1996 Democratic Party Platform
called for a continued increase in border patrol and an increase in the criminal and civil
punishments for employers of undocumented immigrants. Plus, the platform opposed eligibility
for undocumented immigrants in welfare programs, accompanying the Republican Party in
assigning financial responsibility for immigrants to their sponsors. However, in opposition to
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Congressional Republican sentiment, the platform did explicitly support the right to education
for U.S. born undocumented children.
Regarding legal immigration, the Democrats call for continued efforts with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) toward “streamlining procedures, cutting red tape,
and using new technology to make it easier for legal immigrants to accept the responsibilities of
citizenship and truly call America their home” (“Political Party Platforms,” 2016).
It is also worth noting that although this platform urged “everyone in America to learn
English so they can fully share in our daily life,” it “strongly opposed divisive efforts like
English-only legislation, designed to erect barriers between us and force people away from the
culture and heritage of which they are rightly proud.”
2000 Gore
The 2000 Democratic Party Platform shares the 1996 platform’s solution to illegal
immigration: improved border patrol and stringent employer sanctions.
In regard to legal immigration, this platform calls for an increasingly efficient citizenship
application screening process, a focus on family reunification, and guest workers programs
guaranteeing the workers’ protection. The proposed guest worker programs aim to “address only
genuine shortages of highly skilled workers” and to “assure an adequate, predictable supply of
agricultural labor while protecting American farm workers who are among the poorest and more
vulnerable in our society” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). Explicit language is included denouncing
“guest worker programs that lead to exploitation” of labor, additionally advocating for the
“adjusted status of immigrants with deep roots in the country.” In addition to this legal
immigration platform, a sense of cultural assimilation is expected from legal immigrants, which
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is reflected in the Democrats’ support for resources directed toward English language learning
courses for “newcomers.”
2004 Kerry
To address illegal immigration, the 2004 Democratic Party platform focuses on increased
border patrol and paths to citizenship. The platform fails to mention employer sanctions, but
includes improved border patrol as a matter of “strengthening homeland security.” Regarding
the 7 million undocumented immigrants estimated to have been residing in U.S., this platform
argues for earned citizenship: “undocumented immigrant within our borders who clear a background
check, work hard and pay taxes should have a path to earn full participation in America” (Frieden, 2003).

In addressing legal immigration, aside from supporting paths to citizenship for
undocumented residents, the platform backed family reunification for parents, children, and
spouses, as well as cultural assimilation efforts including English-language and civic education
programs.
The 2004 platform does not mention a guest workers program, but the previously cited
statement supporting citizenship for working, tax paying, and non-criminal undocumented
immigrants seemingly applies to any potential guest workers as well.
Republican Party Platforms
1996 Dole
To thwart illegal immigration, the 1996 Republican Party platform stresses the need to
“increase border patrol, accelerate deportation of criminal aliens, toughen penalties for
overstaying visas, and streamline the Immigration and Naturalization Service” (“Party
Platforms,” 2016). Plus, the platform explicitly cites Republican opposition to undocumented
immigrants’ use of “expensive welfare programs” and their support for Proposition 187 in
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California, which aimed to “bar illegal immigrants and their children from receiving government
services like a public education” (Nieves, 1999). More radically, the platform urges for a
constitutional amendment that would reject automatic citizenship for “children born in the
United States of parents who are not legally present in the United States or who are not longterm residents” (“Party Platform,” 2016).
In a stringently restrictive nature, this platform objects to legal immigrants receiving
public aid, assigning the responsibility of immigrants’ “financial well-being” to the immigrants’
sponsors. The platform likens sponsors to “deadbeat dads” who “must provide for the children
they bring into this world”: “deadbeat sponsors” ought “provide for the immigrants they brought
into this country” (“Party Platform,” 2016).
2000 George W. Bush
In addressing illegal immigration, the 2000 Republican Party platform cites economic
development in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean as the long-term solution, but
increased border patrol as the short-term solution, especially targeting smugglers and producers
of fake documents. The platform endorsed the recommendations of the U.S. Commission of
Immigration Reform, including increased border patrol, refined family reunification guidelines
that limit extended relatives’ eligibility, and reform of labor certification programs to increase
employers’ access to qualified foreign workers.
The 2000 platform is undoubtedly in support of expanding guest workers programs,
although without mention of participants’ pathway to citizenship. The platform supported the
expansion of both H-1B and H-2 visas, ensuring available labor in both high-tech, specialized
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positions and “urgent” agricultural work. In describing these programs, the platform explicitly
refers to these workers as “temporary,” implying they would not eventually gain citizenship.
2004 George W. Bush
The 2004 Republican Party platform provides thorough and specific solutions to the
problem of illegal immigration. Framed as an issue of national security, the predominant
component of the platform’s solution is increased border patrol, including “reconnaissance
cameras, border patrol agents, unmanned aerial flights,” and the US-VISIT bio-metric data
system, which tracks the entry and exit of foreign travelers at airports and land border crossings.
Another aspect of intensified border patrol is the platform’s support of “Border Patrol agents’
ability to deport illegal aliens without having first to go through the cumbersome process of
allowing the illegal alien to have a hearing before an immigration judge” (“Party Platforms,”
2016). The platform also calls for “tough penalties” on employers of undocumented immigrants,
while denouncing amnesty as encouraging future illegal immigration.
This platform endorses President Bush’s “new temporary worker program that applies
when no Americans can be found to fill the jobs.” The guest worker program would allow the
participation of present undocumented immigrants and would provide them with an opportunity
to apply for legal citizenship.
Case Analysis
Interest Group Analysis
FAIR
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FAIR rates “high restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. FAIR
represented the far-right portion of the Republican Party, strongly opposing amnesty and also
any guest workers program conceding permanent residency.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates “low expansive” on the immigration policy
preference spectrum. They do support guest workers programs, especially when employment
opportunities cannot be filled with domestic labor. However, a pathway to citizenship is much
less important to the Chamber than a steady stream of adequate labor for business.
MALDEF
MALDEF rates “high expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. In
comprehensive reform, they lobby against increased border patrol and in support of pathways to
citizenship, as well as a guest workers program complete with provisions allowing permanent
residence or citizenship.
NAACP
NAACP rates as “low expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. Torn
between protecting African-American labor and immigrants’ civil rights, NAACP’s membership
in the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights displays their distrust of immigration
restrictionists. They reluctantly support a guest workers program, but only under the
circumstances that immigrant labor is protected and granted a pathway to permanent residency.
AFL-CIO
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The AFL-CIO rates as “low restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum.
Labor’s protection of domestic workers motivates their opposition to guest workers programs,
especially given the possibility that temporary workers may overstay their visas, becoming
exploitable labor that could undercut domestic laborers.
2004 Party Platform Analysis
Democratic Party
The Democratic Party platform rates “high expansive.” The platform’s sole restrictive
quality is found in the vague and brief mention of improved border security, which is framed as a
national security issue. Concerning improved border security, the platform states, “we will work
with our neighbors to strengthen our security so we are safer from those who would come here to
harm us” (Presidential Platforms, 2016). Restrictive provisions that were included in the 1996
and 2000 platforms are left out in the 2004 Democratic Party platform, including provisions for
employer sanctions and those denying welfare benefits for undocumented immigrants.
The most expansive portion of the platform is the provision for earned citizenship for
working, tax paying, and non-criminal undocumented immigrants. This is a very inclusive
stance considering the 7 million estimated undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S.
The platform additionally promotes family reunification efforts.
In defense of this platform’s “high expansive” rating, it should be noted that the vague
provisions for heightened border security is significantly less essential to the platform’s
characterization than the more concrete provisions for an earned pathway to citizenship.
Republican Party
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The Republican Party platform is rated “high restrictive.” Its restrictive qualities include
its support for increases to border patrol, including heightened technological resources and
accelerated deportation capabilities, as well as its firm opposition against amnesty. Specific
technological improvements to border patrol are mentioned within the platform, including
cameras, drones, and a bio-metric data system. Regarding deportation efforts, the platform aims
to suspend habeas corpus for undocumented immigrants, relieving U.S. border patrol’s
obligation to send undocumented immigrants through immigration courts prior to deportation.
The platform also supports stricter penalties for employers of undocumented immigrants,
smugglers of undocumented immigrants, and producers of fraudulent identification documents.
Although provisions concerning undocumented immigrants’ restricted access to public
benefits did not appear in the 2000 platform, due to the radical nature of the 1996 proposals it is
worth mentioning that the 2004 platform also leaves out the extremely restrictive provisions that
were included in the 1996 platform.
The 2004 platform includes few expansive qualities. Although, relative to previous
platforms, the guest workers program included in the platform is more expansive. The program
is standard in that foreign guest workers would only temporarily work and reside in the U.S.
However, the program also permitted undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. to
participate. Those participants would be eligible to submit an application for citizenship.

Yet,

this expansive provision is negligible in comparison to the extent of restrictive proposals riddled
throughout the platform.
Public Opinion Analysis
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For this study’s purposes, given polling data’s evaluation of the public’s perceived “most
important problem facing the nation,” neither immigration, nor illegal immigration will be
considered salient, at least at a national scale. However, for the portion of socially conservative
Republicans, often conservative talk radio listeners, the issue of illegal immigration was
undoubtedly salient.
Case Conclusion
In examining the relationship between the independent variable (interest groups’
immigration policy preferences) and the dependent variable (political party platforms), this study
must first consider public opinion concerning immigration. In the case of 2004, immigration is
not considered salient, so we would expect the parties to remain loyal to interest groups’ policy
preferences. It is important to note, however, that immigration was found to be salient within a
far-right socially conservative portion of the Republican Party. Given this exception, we would
not consider the model flawed if the Republican Party is found to cater to the socially
conservative portion of their electorate with which immigration became salient.
Bawn’s theory of political parties, which expects political parties to promote the policy
preferences of core interest groups in times of low political salience, applies well to the 2004
party platforms and the corresponding interest group policy preferences.
For Democrats, their platform toes a fine line in adhering to the interests of both civil
rights organizations and labor. The Democratic Party platform is rated “high expansive” as it
proposed a pathway to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. who
“clear background checks, work hard, and pay taxes.” The platform also mentions the party’s
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commitment to family reunification efforts. These proposals align well with the policy
preferences of MALDEF and the NAACP, the civil rights organizations in this study.
The Democratic Party platform also makes an effort to please labor’s interests. Although
the AFL-CIO rates “low restrictive” in this case, the Democratic Party platform pays attention to
labor’s concerns with proposed immigration reform. But labor’s main concern is the
implementation of a guest workers program that would exploit undocumented immigrants’ labor
(especially if workers overstay their visas), simultaneously undermining American citizens’
employment. However, the Democratic Party platform fails to mention a guest workers
program. The only mention of immigrant employment is the platform’s call for a path to
citizenship for those that work hard—a provision that labor would support, given that a path to
citizenship protects laborers from exploitation and undercutting wages of citizens.
The Republican Party platform also aims to appease two relatively contradictory
interests: business and immigration restrictionists. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
representative of American business interests in this study, desires a guest workers program that
provides a steady source of labor for American businesses, while opposing employer
sanctioning. The platform finds no trouble in catering to business’s desire for a guest workers
program, as President Bush proposed a temporary worker program in 2004. However, the
platform does endorse stringent employer sanctions, which the Chamber of Commerce firmly
opposes. The Republican Party’s decision to favor restrictionist policy over business interests
gives light to their recognition of immigration’s salience within their far right, socially
conservative supporters.

89
In Bawn et. al’s model, when an issue becomes salient, the “electoral blindspot”
decreases in size, meaning the electorate is more attentive to candidates’ positions, effectively
forcing parties to shift toward appeasing their electorate rather than their core interest groups.
For the Republican Party in 2004, the “electoral blindspot” shrunk surrounding the issue of
immigration, causing the party to serve their core electorate before considering business’s
interests. The decreased size of the “electoral blindspot” was due to far-right social
conservatives’ heightened attentiveness to immigration, especially illegal immigration. As
mentioned previously in the “public opinion” section, talk radio programs fueled the far-right
social conservatives’ outrage against proposals of “amnesty” and in support of increased border
security proposals. This resulted in a Republican platform rich with restrictive measures closely
aligned to the interests of FAIR, including various methods of intensifying border patrol,
deportation, and a stated opposition to amnesty. Bawn et. al’s model fits in this instance,
explaining the Republican Party platform’s favor of FAIR’s policy preferences over business’s
as an effort to chase votes amid amplified political salience, not as the party serving one interest
group over another.
Case Study #3: 2016 Party Platforms
Narrative
Following the failed comprehensive immigration reform efforts of 2006 and 2007,
Obama boldly announced his intention to achieve comprehensive reform within his first year as
President. Immigration reform had become a political hot potato in the previous term, especially
within the socially conservative right wing of the Republican Party, which staunchly opposed
“amnesty” provisions that were perceived as “gifts” of citizenship to criminal trespassers. Yet,
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in the 2008 Presidential campaign, Obama boasted about his Senatorial record as a persistent
supporter of immigration reform, helping him earn 67% of the Hispanic vote (Lopez, 2008).
Despite his electoral support, Obama’s immigration reform attempts resembled those of the past:
plagued with congressional gridlock.
Obama’s promise to achieve immigration reform within his first year went unfulfilled,
without visible progress. In fact, “the administration sought to prove it was tough on illegal
immigration by ratcheting up deportations” (Ball, 2014). At last, in 2010, the Dream Act was
presented to Congress. Although not comprehensive reform, The Dream Act hoped “to permit
young people brought illegally into the U.S. by their parents the opportunity for
citizenship…contingent on them completing two years of college or military service” (Brandt,
2010). After passing the House 216-198 (Democrats 208 for and 38 against, Republicans 8 for
and 160 against), Senate Democrats failed to get the 60 votes necessary to pass the Dream Act
with a supermajority (55-41, Democrats 50 for and 5 against, Republicans 36 against and 3 for),
effectively killing the bill’s congressional life amid a Tea Party congressional take-over in the
2010 mid-term election.
In response to the Dream Act’s congressional failure and the inability to work with an
increasingly conservative Republican congress, Obama took matters into his own hands in June
2012, issuing an executive order, referred to as the Consideration of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to “stop deporting young illegal immigrants who entered the United
States as children if they meet certain requirements” (Cohen, 2012). The order additionally
instituted an opportunity for eligible individuals to apply for a work visa, but did not include a
path to citizenship. Following the highest number of annual U.S. Immigration and Customs
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Enforcement (ICE) deportations in history and the administration’s failure to meet its promise of
immigration reform in its first year, Obama’s order aimed to appease Hispanic dissatisfaction.
Many Congressional Republicans were up in arms over what they perceived to be an “unlawful
and unconstitutional policy,” as well as a political move to attract Hispanic votes only months
prior to the 2012 presidential election (Cohen, 2012).
Obama’s executive order proved well received from Hispanics, as he earned 71% of the
Hispanic vote in his 2012 re-election, the largest share since 1996 (Lopez and Taylor, 2012).
However, Janet Marguía, President of The National Council of La Raza, a high-profile MexicanAmerican rights advocacy group, didn’t forget the Obama administration’s increased deportation
rates and its failure to deliver comprehensive immigration reform after hopeful campaign
promises; she referred to Obama as the “deporter-in-chief” (Ball, 2014). After Obama’s 2012 reelection, comprehensive immigration reform efforts continued, but the trend of congressional
gridlock sustained.
Republicans cited immigration as an issue that may have cost them the 2012 Presidential
election. To regain lost ground, with support from the business community and a large share of
their party base, Republicans were eager to exhibit their concern with illegal immigration. In
their 2012 autopsy concerning their 2012 presidential election loss, the Republican Party
admitted, “among the steps Republicans take in the Hispanic community and beyond, we must
embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform”, fearing, “if we do not, our Party's
appeal will continue to shrink to its core constituencies only” (Franke-Ruta 2013). In 2013, a
bipartisan group of eight Senators, including Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Bob Menendez (D-NJ),
Dick Durbin (D-Ill), Michael Bennet (D-Colo), Marco Rubio (R-Fla), John McCain (R-AZ), and
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Lindsey Graham (R-SC), created an immigration proposal. The proposal was truly a
compromise, aiming to “clear the way for millions of undocumented residents to have a chance
at citizenship, attract workers from all over the world and devote unprecedented resources for
security along the US-Mexico border” (Min Kim, 2013). The proposal passed the Senate with
room to spare (68-32, all 52 Democrats in favor, 14 Republicans in favor, 32 against) (“S. 744,”).
With 14 Republican Senators willing to compromise, comprehensive immigration reform
seemed incredibly plausible. Yet, conservative House Republicans proved less willing to
compromise than those in the Senate, exposing a growing divide between the Republican Party’s
establishment and the Tea Party.
In the midst of a “fight for the soul” of the Republican Party, immigration compromise
was an opportunity for the far-right Tea Party to make a case for its “angry, oppositionist,
populist strain” of the GOP against moderate mainstream “pragmatists” (Ball, 2013). Indeed,
socially conservative Republicans, along with moderates weary of the political risk of
immigration reform including amnesty provisions, pressured House Speaker John Boehner (ROH) to deny the possibility of a compromise with the Senate’s proposal. Ultimately, Boehner
defended the House’s refusal to advance with immigration reform by expressing their distrust for
the administration’s execution of the law, citing overreaching executive orders as threatening to
any potential immigration reform. By early 2014, the possibility for comprehensive reform had
again withered.
Amid a spike in the number of unaccompanied, undocumented children arriving at the
United States’ southern border, the immigration process seemed more in need of reform than
ever (Park, 2014). Like Obama’s disappointing first year in office without immigration reform,
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he again failed to deliver on his promises for reform throughout the summer of 2014, blaming
“Republicans’ extreme politicization of the issue” as “harmful to the long-term prospects for
comprehensive immigration reform” (Ball, 2014). Without the ability to compromise with
Congress on comprehensive reform, Obama again pledged to act himself. Yet, concerned with
numerous red state Democratic Senators’ chances in the mid-term elections, the Obama
administration decided to delay any executive action until after November of 2014.
In late November of 2014, after Republicans gained control of the Senate and retained
control of the House in the midterm elections, Obama presented numerous executive orders
aiming to expand his previous executive action on immigration. The orders aimed to “grant up to
five million unauthorized immigrants protection from deportation, expand Obama’s 2012
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and enact Deferred Action for
Parental Accountability (DAPA), a deferral program allowing approximately 4 million
undocumented parents of American citizens or legal permanent residents to avoid deportation”
(Parlapiano, 2014). Yet, this time, the courts challenged Obama’s use executive power. In
February of 2015, “a federal judge in Texas halted Obama’s executive orders on immigration,”
citing an inadequate understanding of the public’s opinion on the order (Greenblatt, 2015).
Republicans applauded the continuation of deportations and the check on Obama’s executive
powers. By June 2016, a 4-4 tie in the Supreme Court upheld the Texas ruling, ultimately
concluding Obama’s mostly failed efforts at immigration reform (Liptak and Shear, 2016).
In 2015 and 2016, both parties’ eventual Presidential candidates established their
immigration stances. Most notably, Donald Trump announced his candidacy in June, 2015,
“with a pledge to build a ‘great wall’ on the Mexican border,” build a “massive deportation
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force,” and “humanely” deport 11 million undocumented immigrants (LoBianco, 2015; Lyons,
2016). Trump faced fierce opposition from fellow Republican candidates like Jeb Bush and John
Kasich, who referred to Trump’s proposals as “a silly argument.” In contrast, Democratic Party
candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders “promised to integrate legal immigrants and help
more gain citizenship while ending deportations” (Lyons, 2016). Aside from concerns regarding
illegal immigration from Mexico and Central America, numerous terror attacks spurred debate
regarding the national security implications of immigration policy.
Throughout 2015 and 2016, several high-profile terror attacks, coupled with a Syrian
refugee crisis, “prompted fear in the United States about terrorists slipping into the country by
posing as Syrian refugees” (Lyons, 2016). Public officials responded in various ways, including
Congress’s reaction to a shooting of 36 by a Pakistani visa-holder in San Bernardino, California:
passage of “legislation requiring those with dual citizenship in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Syria to
apply for a visa for temporary visits to the U.S.” (Lyons, 2016). This legislation was passed with
overwhelming support (497 to 19), preventing “those who have visited those countries in the last
five years, from traveling to the United States without a visa” (Edwards, 2015). In the week
following the San Bernardino attack, Trump proposed a highly contentious plan: “a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can
figure out what is going on” (Vitali, 2016). The acceptance of refugees and the protection of
Americans from terrorism became central issues throughout the 2016 presidential election.
In a surprising upset, Donald Trump won the Presidential election in November of 2016,
claiming to be the “law and order candidate.” By January 27th, one week into the Trump
presidency, an executive order was signed “that promised to keep ‘radical Islamic terrorists out
of the United States of America’” (McGraw and Kelsey, 2016). The order “took immediate
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effect to bar admission to the U.S. of all people with non-immigrant or immigrant visas from
seven countries—Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—for 90 days.” The order
also included “an indefinite ban on refugees from war-torn Syria” (McGraw and Kelsey, 2016).
All of the countries included in the executive order were Muslim-majority nations, leading many
critics to cite the order’s intent to ban Muslims, as Trump had claimed he would during his
Presidential campaign. The order was met with massive protests at airports in response to the
hundreds of refugees and immigrants being held upon arrival across the nation, “caught in
communications limbo between the White House and the Department of Homeland Security—”
(McGraw and Kelsey, 2016). The Washington state Attorney General filed a lawsuit in a U.S.
District Court, ultimately leading to the Ninth Circuit court’s unanimous decision to disapprove
of the order, citing Trump’s previous promises to implement a Muslim travel ban and an absence
of evidence that supported the national security dangers of suspending the order. On March 6th,
Trump signed a second executive order, removing Iraq from the list of home countries barred
from entry, along with the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. This order has also met challenges
in the courts, where it remains as of this writing.
In addition to Trump’s executive orders, he has since advanced his most anticipated
immigration policy: plans to construct a border wall on the southern border. In his proposed
budget, Trump “includes a $2 billion down payment on his signature border wall, one of the
single largest investments in the budget plan,” along with plans “to hire 100 new government
lawyers, add 1,500 law enforcement officials and spend more than $1 billion on detention and
deportation” (Fandos, 2017).
Public Opinion
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The National Attitude Toward Immigration Levels from 2004 – 2016
Between 2004 and 2016, the national attitude toward immigration levels remained
generally steady, gradually shifting toward an increasingly welcoming stance on immigration. In
2004, the nation’s post-9/11 shift toward more restrictive immigration level preferences was still
visible; 33% of respondents favored present immigration levels in 2004 compared to 42% in
June of 2001 and 49% favored decreased immigration levels in 2004 compared to 41% in June
2001 (Gallup). Following the restrictive shift after 9/11, beginning in approximately 2003,
national attitudes toward immigration levels began to rebound, more closely resembling pre-9/11
attitudes. By 2016, attitudes toward immigration levels were actually more expansive than pre9/11 levels: 21% favored increased immigration levels compared to 14% in June, 2001 and 38%
favored decreased levels compared to 41% in 2001.
In all, by 2016 Americans overwhelmingly accepted immigration as a “good thing for
this country today”: 72% of American adults cited immigration as a “good thing,” the highest
portion of respondents from 2001 to 2016 (Gallup). A small racial divide was visible between
respondents’ attitudes toward immigration: 70% of white respondents, compared with 76% of
blacks and 79% of Hispanics thought immigration to be a “good thing,” while 27% of whites,
compared with 18% of blacks and 17% of Hispanics called it a “bad thing.” These racial divides
became starker regarding attitudes toward specific immigration policy proposals, as described
below.
Immigration Policy Proposals
Deportation
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A large majority of Americans opposed proposals to deport all undocumented immigrants
residing in America (Gallup). Yet, Whites responded more supportively to the proposal than
Blacks and Hispanics. In the Summer of 2016, 32% of American adults supported the proposal
to deport all immigrants living illegally in the U.S., while 66% opposed the proposal. Whites
were more likely than the average American adult to support this proposal; 36% of whites
declared their support for deportation while 62% opposed it. Blacks and Hispanics were less
likely to support deportation proposals: 23% of blacks and 21% of Hispanics were in support,
while 76% of Blacks and 78% of Hipsanics were in opposition.
Building a Wall
Trump’s plans to build a border wall on the southern border were also generally opposed
nationally (Gallup). However, whites were found to be more likely to support Trump’s border
wall than Black and Hispanics. In the summer of 2016, nationally, one third of adults supported
building the wall, while two thirds opposed the proposal. 41% of Whites, 23% strongly so,
supported the wall’s construction, while 59% opposed the proposal. In contrast, only 18% of
Blacks and 16% of Hispanics supported the wall’s construction. In fact, included within the 82%
of Blacks and Hispanics who opposed a wall’s construction, 55% of Blacks and 40% of
Hispanics “strongly opposed” the wall proposal.
Path to Citizenship
In general, national public opinion supported a path to citizenship for undocumented
immigrants already residing in the U.S. Nationally, 84% supported “allowing immigrants living
in the U.S. illegally the chance to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain requirements over a
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period of time” (Gallup). Again, a slight racial difference was visible between whites’ support
compared to blacks’ and Hispanics’. In this case, Whites were as likely as Hispanics and Blacks
to support paths to citizenship, but not with the same enthusiasm: 82% of Whites supported a
pathway to citizenship with 37% declaring “strong support,” while 84% of Blacks and 92% of
Hispanics supported a pathway to citizenship, 48% of Blacks and 42% of Hispanics declaring
“strong support.”
Obama’s Executive Orders
The starkest racial difference regarding immigration policy support appeared when
respondents gauged their approval of the “executive actions President Obama plans to take”
(Gallup). In this instance, American adults, responding in late 2014, were more likely to
disapprove than to approve of President Obama’s planned executive orders. However, Blacks
and Hispanics were more likely to express approval than disapproval of Obama’s executive
orders. The gap between White support and minority approval was wide. Only 30% of whites
claimed their approval, compared to 68% of Blacks and 64% of Hispanics.
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Figure 8: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.” procon.org.
http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017).
Partisan Opinions
Immigrants’ Contributions
In 1994, 30% of Republicans and 32% of Democrats agreed with the following claim:
“immigrants today strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents” (Jones, 2016).
By 2006, Democrats’ acceptance of this positive view toward immigrants grew to 49%, while
Republicans’ positive views increased, but at a slower rate to 36% (Figure 9). Then, over the
next decade, Democrats’ likelihood to agree with the statement on immigrants’ positive
contributions to the country spiked, but Republicans’ remained stagnant: 78% of Democrats and
35% of Republicans agreed with the statement in 2016.
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Figure 9: Jones, Bradley. 2016. “Americans’ Views of Immigrants Marked by Widening
Partisan, Generational Divides.” Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/04/15/americans-views-of-immigrants-marked-by-widening-partisangenerational-divides/ (March 26, 2017).
The Wall
The partisan differences on immigration policy preferences were exceedingly visible in
levels of support and opposition for the construction of a border wall. Trump supporters (84% in
support) were the most likely to favor the border wall proposal, while Bernie Sanders supporters
(91% in opposition) were the most likely to oppose the proposal. Supporters of more moderate
candidates, such as John Kasich (53% opposed, 45% in support), were more mixed in support or
opposition for the wall.
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Figure 10: Jones, Bradley. 2016. “Americans’ Views of Immigrants Marked by Widening
Partisan, Generational Divides.” Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/04/15/americans-views-of-immigrants-marked-by-widening-partisangenerational-divides/ (March 26, 2017).
The Nation’s “Top Problems”
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In 2016, 7% of respondents to the question, “What is the most important problem facing
the country today” answered “immigration/illegal aliens” (Gallup Poll, 2016). This was the 3rd
most prevalent answer behind “economy in general” with 18% of respondents and
“unemployment/jobs” at 8%.

Figure 11: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.” procon.org.
http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017).
Interest Groups
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FAIR
FAIR was a staunch opponent to Obama’s executive orders on immigration, urging “the
next president to make it a priority to reverse the damage done by a rogue administration”
(O’Brien et. al 2, 2016). They deemed Obama’s orders to represent “amnesty programs” that
“reward law-breakers and punish those who have followed the law” (O’Brien et. al 3, 2016).
FAIR published a document that presented their opinion of how the winner of the 2016
Presidential election ought act on immigration in their first year in office. Not surprisingly, these
proposals focused on enforcing existing immigration laws, especially on the border, restricting
rights for undocumented immigrants, and limiting immigration overall.
In terms of enforcing immigration laws and securing the nation’s borders, FAIR
advocated for the construction of a “physical barrier on the Southern border,” ending all “catch
and release” policies that do not immediately require police to deport undocumented immigrants,
and securing the northern Canadian border in order to “remain vigilant that third country foreign
nationals do not exploit the northern border in an attempt to enter the U.S. undetected” (O’Brien
et. al 2016, 6). The proposals also supported increased punishment for repeat immigration lawbreakers. Plus, FAIR denounced sanctuary cities that expressed leniency in enforcing
immigration law. Rather, FAIR advocates for the restoration of cooperation between federal,
state, and local law enforcement in enforcing immigration law.
In addressing the undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S., FAIR
vehemently opposed their access to public benefits. They opposed amnesties of all kind,
advocated for strict visa overstay policing, hoped to end “birthright citizenship,” opposed free
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healthcare for the undocumented, and wished to vigorously prosecute undocumented
immigrants’ employers.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
As expected, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was most concerned with immigrants’ role
in the American workforce. Regarding guest workers programs, the Chamber was in support of
expanding both programs for both low-skilled and high-skilled foreign workers, especially aimed
toward U.S.-educated STEM graduates.
Concerning the enforcement of immigration law, the Chamber supported the
improvement of E-Verify, the employer verification system that allows employers to check on
immigrants’ citizenship status. Previously the Chamber had been opposed to E-Verify’s
implementation because it shifted the responsibility of law enforcement onto American
businesses, but by 2016 the Chamber had embraced the program, supporting its improvement.
To address the undocumented immigrants within the U.S., the Chamber denounced
deportation and self-deportation as viable options, instead supporting an earned pathway to
citizenship consisting of criminal background checks and national security clearances, a fine,
progress toward English proficiency, and the government’s implementation of a mandatory
electronic employment verification (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2015).
MALDEF
Amid Donald Trump’s election, MALDEF released a statement regarding his
immigration policy proposals, in which MALDEF denounced the border wall, claiming it
“threatened to bankrupt the nation’s treasury” (MALDEF, 2017). MALDEF also declared its
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opposition to increased border security, charging “aggressive interior enforcement” to be “an
abject failure, delivering tremendous upheaval and harm to families, schools, and workplaces”
(MALDEF, 2017).
NAACP
Throughout the 2016 election season, the NAACP sided with civil rights organizations to
defend immigrants’ rights. In this spirit, the NAACP pledged to “join with allies to show
Congress that a broad, diverse coalition of conscience demands a fair and common sense path to
citizenship” (Hesson, 2013).
In reaction to President Trump’s executive order’s ban of citizens from seven Muslimmajority nations, the NAACP released a statement denouncing the orders, claiming they
“indicate a callous disregard for civil liberties and the basic values of a nation born of
immigrants” (NAACP, 2017).
AFL-CIO
The AFL-CIO supported a “roadmap to citizenship, not just temporary status, for all
workers” since “a broken immigration system ‘drags everybody down’ including wages for all
workers” (“AFL-CIO Hopes,” 2015). It supported Obama’s executive actions, as exemplified by
the AFL-CIO’s workshops that helped immigrants capitalize on DACA’s provisions for
deportation relief, as well as ensure their knowledge of workers’ rights (“AFL-CIO Hopes,”
2015).
The labor union also explicitly opposed President Trump’s immigration proposals,
including “building a wall on our border, scapegoating immigrants and refugees, and shutting out
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people of Muslim faith,” which it claimed would “sow fear of raids among workers, promote
racial profiling and erode core constitutional protections” (AFL-CIO, 2017).
Party Platforms
Democrats
2008 Obama
The 2008 Democratic Party platform describes a general plan for comprehensive
immigration reform, including efforts to stifle illegal immigration, such as improved border
patrol and enhanced employer sanctions. Specifically, the platform endorses the development of
a method that allows employers to easily access potential employees’ legal statuses. Plus, the
platform includes provisions aiming to facilitate the integration of undocumented immigrants,
such as increased work visas that promote family reunification. With the domestic laborer in
mind, the work visa provision does explicitly focus on family members of immigrants and
“immigrants who meet the demand for jobs that employers cannot fill, as long as appropriate
labor market protections and standards are in place.” The platform also calls for a pathway to
earned citizenship for undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. The earned
citizenship requires that immigrants “pay a fine, pay taxes, learn English, and go to the back of
the line for the opportunity to become citizens” (“Party Platforms,” 2016).
2012 Obama
After Obama’s first term, the 2012 Democratic Party platform urged Congress to
compromise on comprehensive immigration reform and highlighted President Obama’s
successes in immigration reform despite congressional gridlock. Overall, this platform proposes
heavily expansive immigration reform, mainly regarding legal immigration and undocumented
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immigrants already residing in the U.S. Plus, the platform boasts Obama’s progress in managing
illegal immigration.
Regarding expansive reform, the platform calls for an earned pathway to citizenship,
continued efforts toward family reunification, and increased English language learning resources
for immigrants. The earned pathway to citizenship includes learning English and paying taxes.
Plus, the platform boasts Obama’s support for the DREAM Act, which was defeated by
Republicans, along with President Obama’s executive order that provided temporary relief from
deportation for undocumented children. The explicit mention of earned citizenship for
undocumented children could be considered a proposal for future immigration policy reform.
In terms of addressing illegal immigration, the platform boasts Obama’s successes,
claiming the Southwest border to be “more secure than in the past 20 years,” while “unlawful
crossings are at a 40-year low” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). It continues to support Homeland
Security’s “prioritization of deporting criminals over non-threatening immigrants” and claims the
“Border Patrol is better staffed than at any time in history.” The platform does ensure that the
administration is pro-employer sanctions, claiming that “we are continuing to hold employers
accountable for whom they hire,” but without mentioning potential improvements or changes.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the platform explicitly opposes “states that sought to
interfere with federal immigration law by passing local measures targeting immigrants, which
the Obama administration challenged in court” (“Party Platforms,” 2016).
2016 Clinton

108
The 2016 Democratic Party platform proposes extremely expansive immigration reform.
The lengthy list of expansive proposals included: a path to citizenship for undocumented
immigrants residing in the U.S., support for family reunification, support for Obama’s DACA
and DAPA executive orders, granting driver’s licenses and in-state college tuition to
DREAMers, investing in English education programs, ending deportation raids of families and
children, guaranteeing “government-funded counsel for unaccompanied children in immigration
courts,” providing accessible healthcare to all, ridding government contracts with for-profit
private prisons and detention centers, rejecting any “religious tests” required for immigration,
and objecting to Donald Trump’s proposal to build a border wall (“Party Platforms,” 2016).
The platform fails to mention virtually any restrictive proposals, even the most basic:
increased border patrol. This differs from the 2012 and 2008 party platforms.
Republicans
2008 McCain
The 2008 Republican Party platform includes a significant portion on immigration and
illegal immigration, most of which included restrictive policy proposals. The platform calls for
increased border patrol and deportation efforts, restrictions to undocumented immigrants’ access
to public benefits, defunding sanctuary cities, declaring English the official national language,
and opposing amnesty in all forms.
Specifically, the platform focuses on enforcing “the rule of law” (“Party Platforms,
2016). Most directly, the platform urges for the employment of several thousand additional law
enforcement officers, accelerated deportation efforts, as well as the completion of The Border
Security First Act’s border fence. The platform clearly articulates that the party considers efforts
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advancing undocumented immigrants’ ability to assimilate to undermine the rule of law. Access
to drivers’ licenses, in-state college tuition, and social security are mentioned within the platform
as examples that would encourage further illegal immigration.
To improve previously implemented employer sanctions, the platform supports the use of
the E-Verify, an internet-based software aiming to “empower employers so they can know with
confidence that those they hire are permitted to work” (“Party Platforms,” 2016)
2012 Romney
The 2012 Republican Party platform resembles the 2008 platform in its heavily restrictive
nature, but an additional focus on guest workers programs was absent in 2008. In 2012, the
platform calls for an increase in “granting more work visas to holders of advanced degrees in
science, technology, engineering, and math from other nations,” as well as “the utility of a legal
and reliable source of foreign labor where needed through a new guest worker program” (“Party
Platforms,” 2016). It also adds, however, that the guest workers programs would “encourage
illegal aliens to return home voluntarily, while enforcing the law against those who overstay their
visas.”
Like in 2008, the “highest priority” for the 2012 platform was “to secure the rule of law
both at our borders and at ports of entry.” The restrictive provisions from the 2008 platform are
echoed in 2012, yet intensified. For example, the 2012 platform reiterated the 2008 platform’s
support for the completion of the still incomplete border fence and for accelerated deportation
processes, but the 2012 platform went on to support aerial surveillance efforts on the border and
“long-term detention authority” for the Department of Homeland Security.
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Provisions restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits also
resembled the 2008 platform. Although the 2012 platform fails to mention limiting
undocumented immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses or social security, it does include support
for the S.A.V.E. Program. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (S.A.V.E.)
program is “an internet-based system that verifies the lawful presence of applicants—prior to the
granting of any State or federal government entitlements or IRS refunds.” The platform also
endorses the Everify system for employers.
Per usual for the Republican Party, the 2012 platform rejects all forms of amnesty.
2016 Trump
The 2016 Republican Party platform continues the trend for Republican platforms,
claiming again, “Our highest priority, therefore, must be to secure our borders and all ports of
entry and to enforce our immigration laws” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). The restrictive provisions
included in the 2012 and 2008 platforms remain in the 2016 platform, but additional plans are
included to respond to Obama’s executive orders, to combat “Islamic terrorism,” and to address
an influx in refugee admittance.
Like previous Republican Party platforms, the 2016 platform opposes all forms of
amnesty, endorses the E-verify and S.A.V.E. programs, and supports accelerated deportations
and stricter penalties for immigrant smugglers and manufacturers of fraudulent documents. New
to the 2016 platform is the proposal for a border wall that would “cover the entirety of the
southern border…sufficient to stop both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.” Plus, the platform
supported states that had enacted laws targeting undocumented immigrants, while advocating to
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strip federal funds from cities considering themselves “sanctuary cities” for undocumented
immigrants.
The platform makes a point to denounce President Obama’s executive orders on
immigration, referring to them as “unlawful amnesties.” Obama’s executive orders are framed
as irresponsible given the perceived amount of “terrorism, drug cartels, human trafficking, and
criminal gangs” plaguing the U.S. Furthermore, the platform opposes Obama’s orders and any
other provisions resembling amnesty because “the presence of millions of unidentified
individuals in this country poses grave risks to the safety and sovereignty of the United States.”
The 2016 platform also includes provisions concerning refugee admittance and its
supposed connection with “Islamic terrorism.” To address these concerns, the platform exhibits
concern with national security, explaining, “refugees who cannot be carefully vetted cannot be
admitted to the country, especially those whose homelands have been the breeding grounds for
terrorism.” Drawing on terrorism’s place in American history, the platform urges for “special
scrutiny to those foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States from terror-sponsoring
countries or from regions associated with Islamic terrorism. This was done successfully after
September 11, 2001, under the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which should
be renewed now.”
Case Analysis
Interest Group Analysis
FAIR
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FAIR rates high restrictive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. FAIR
supported restricting overall immigration levels and exclusively restrictive immigration policy,
including the construction of a border wall, intensifying immigration law enforcement
domestically, and restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates low expansive on the immigration policy
preference spectrum. The Chamber supported expanding guest workers programs, as well as an
earned pathway to citizenship, albeit a difficult one, for undocumented immigrants already
residing in the U.S.
The Chamber did support the expansion and improvement of the E-Verify program, a
digital program that allows employers to verify the citizenship status of potential employees.
This is considered a restrictive program since employer sanctions limit undocumented
immigrants’ ability to gain employment.
MALDEF
MALDEF rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum.
MALDEF supported President Obama’s executive orders that provided deportation relief, but
also supported pathways to citizenship. MALDEF strongly opposes all of President Trump’s
immigration proposals, including heightened domestic immigration law enforcement, the
construction of a border wall, and his executive orders banning visas.
NAACP
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The NAACP rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. Their
allegiance alongside other civil rights organizations in support of immigrants’ rights and in
opposition to President Trump’s highly restrictive immigration policy proposals exemplifies the
NAACP’s support for expansive immigration policy. Plus, with both immigrants’ rights and
black domestic workers in mind, the NAACP supports full citizenship for immigrant workers.
AFL-CIO
The AFL-CIO rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. With
an increasingly Hispanic membership, the AFL-CIO expresses concern with President Trump’s
potentially discriminatory policy propositions. Plus, with both immigrants’ rights and domestic
workers’ interests in mind, the AFL-CIO supports full citizenship for immigrant workers.
2016 Party Platform Analysis
Democratic Party Platform
The Democratic Party Platform rates high expansive on the immigration policy
preference spectrum. The platform proposes exclusively expansive immigration policy. These
expansive policy proposals include provisions for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented
immigrants, expanded access to public benefits for undocumented immigrants, and ending
private detention centers and prisons. The platform fails to mention restrictive policy proposals,
even the most basic: border enforcement. This platform also endorses Obama’s executive
orders, which provided deportation relief for undocumented immigrant children.
Republican Party Platform
The Republican Party Platform rates high restrictive on the immigration policy
preference spectrum. The platform proposes exclusively restrictive immigration policy. The
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platform opposes amnesty, proposes the construction of a border wall, supports employer
sanctions, hopes to deny undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits, and suggests
reinstituting post-9/11 vetting programs that aim extreme scrutiny on refugees from “areas
associated with Islamic terrorism” (“Party Platform” 2016).
Public Opinion Analysis
This study considers immigration to be salient in 2016 given its consideration as a “top
problem facing the country today.” Given immigration’s salience, we’d expect party platforms
to cater to public opinion ahead of interest groups’ interests.
As in the 2004 case study, immigration is especially salient for the socially conservative
portion of the Republican Party base. Given the effective grassroots activism that socially
conservative voters and activists have demonstrated in the past, most notably using far-right
media, it would not be surprising if the Republican Party catered to this group’s interests above
other portions of the party’s base.
Case Conclusion

Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties applies well to immigration policy preferences of
2016. The theory would predict that amid heightened political salience and a shrinking
“electoral blind spot” concerning immigration, political parties would cater to their electorate
before pleasing interest groups. In the case of immigration policy in 2016, this study’s findings
support this hypothesis; both the Democratic and Republican Parties shift their focus toward
pleasing the electorate first.
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The Democrats crafted an extremely expansive party platform in response to Democratic
voters’ massive shift toward accepting immigrants as positive contributions to the country.
Moreover, the Democratic Party fervently rejected Donald Trump’s restrictive immigration
proposals. Reflecting the party’s attention to Democrats’ shift toward accepting immigrants, the
platform does not mention proposals for increased border security or improved employer
sanctions, both of which were restrictive policies included in past Democratic Party platforms.
The platform’s increased thoroughness on immigration and its exclusively expansive policy
proposals can be credited to immigration’s rise in salience.
The Democratic Party’s immigration stances align with both civil rights advocacy
groups’ and labor’s immigration policy preferences. In supporting pathways to citizenship and
denouncing President Trump’s restrictive policies, the Democratic Party pleases their core
interest groups. It is worth noting that labor-oriented groups like the NAACP and AFL-CIO
undoubtedly shifted toward more expansive policy preferences in the 2016 case study.
Historically, these groups have supported some restrictive immigration policy, such as employer
sanctions, and opposed some expansive policy, such as guest workers programs. However,
immigration’s context in 2016 can explain these shifts. In the past, labor-oriented groups have
supported restrictive policy provisions during congressional efforts toward comprehensive
immigration reform. Contrastingly, in 2016, immigration is framed in a restrictive nature and
discourse is often framed in response to Trump’s restrictive policy proposals, leading to policy
preferences that are contrastingly expansive.
The Republican Party platform also appears to cater to the electorate, only from the
opposite side of the immigration policy preference spectrum. The Republican platform includes
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extremely restrictive immigration policy proposals, some of which did not appear in previous
party platforms. These restrictive policy stances included support for the border wall’s
construction, hopes to limit undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits, and stringent
opposition of Obama’s executive orders’ deportation relief.
The Republican Party platform aligns well with FAIR’s interests, while the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce seems to be overlooked. This is telling considering the Chamber
historically acted as a primary core interest within the Republican Party. However, this shift
doesn’t necessarily mean the Republican Party hoped to please FAIR over the Chamber.
This study considers the Republican Party’s shift toward FAIR’s restrictive policy
preferences as an attempt to cater to a socially conservative electorate amid immigration’s
heightened salience, not a shift in the party’s core interest groups. As exemplified by House
Republicans’ hesitancy to engage in immigration reform compromises that include amnesty
provisions, the fear of receiving electoral backlash from socially conservative voter bases has
pressured Republicans to take hardline restrictionist immigration stances. The New York Times’
story, “Steve Deace and the Power of Conservative Media,” demonstrates the shrinking
“electoral blindspot” surrounding immigration policy, especially within the Republican Party:
“the people who tune in daily to Deace (a popular grassroots conservative radio personality from
Iowa) and his ultraconservative peers are also the ones most likely to vote and to follow closely
the politicians they elect.” (Calmes, 2015). The Republican Party’s submission to socially
conservative voters makes sense given the ultra-right media’s tendency to “leave Democrats
virtually unscathed in favor of attacking Republicans — the damned party ‘‘establishment,’’ in
particular” (Calmes, 2015).
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Although the Republican Party autopsy after the 2012 presidential election encouraged
the party to welcome comprehensive immigration reform in an effort to attract Hispanic voters, it
appears this strategy was abandoned in 2016 in an effort to appeal to the party’s mostly white
core constituents. As described in the public opinion section, whites were much more supportive
of Donald Trump’s plans to construct a border wall and they were more than doubly opposed to
Obama’s executive orders than blacks and Hispanics. The Republican Party’s acceptance of
Trump’s exceedingly restrictive immigration policy appears to be a plea to its core constituents
in order to remain electorally relevant, as expected within Bawn et. al’s theory amid
immigration’s high political salience.

VI: Comparative Analysis
Did the model work?
This study considers Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to apply well to the selected
case studies. The selected cases revealed that in periods when immigration’s political salience
was low, political parties catered to core interest groups ahead of the electorate’s interests
concerning immigration, and vice versa when immigration’s political salience was high.
The most demonstrative example of Bawn et. al’s “electoral blind spot” in action was the
Republican Party’s response to immigration’s increased political salience in the 2004 case study.
As political salience increases regarding an issue, Bawn et. al claims that the “electoral blind
spot” surrounding the issue shrinks, meaning the electorate is more attentive to candidates’
decisions and more knowledgeable on the salient issue. In 2004, immigration was not nationally
salient, but it did become salient for a portion of the Republican Party voter base: the socially
conservative. Given grassroots social conservatives’ electoral influence as effective grassroots
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activists, the Republican Party’s immigration policy stances become more restrictive in order to
cater to socially conservative voters.
Some cases more clearly exhibited Bawn et. al’s theory in action. The 2004 and 2016
cases showcased instances when immigration became politically salient, at least within a portion
of the electorate. For this reason, the study’s variables were more visible, allowing for more
information upon which to evaluate the application of Bawn et. al’s theory.
In the 1984 case, immigration was not politically salient. In effect, party platforms were
brief and vague when referring to immigration policy. This made it difficult to evaluate parties’
allegiance to core interest groups or the electorate. This study was still able to analyze cases
when immigration was not politically salient, but the analyses were based on less supportive
evidence than in cases when immigration was politically salient. Ultimately, this study
concluded that the vague 1984 platforms were partially due to political parties’ aims to please as
many core interest groups as possible, some of which possessed conflicting interests concerning
immigration policy.
Variables
Independent Variable: Interest Groups’ Immigration Policy Preferences
This study’s independent variable, interest groups’ immigration policy preferences, was
measured qualitatively through analyzing interest groups’ publications, congressional hearing
statements, and newspaper reports. Data was generally easy to find, especially given the case
studies’ temporal proximity to immigration policy reform efforts.
One weakness in this study’s evaluation of interest groups is the absence of measuring
interest groups’ influence on political parties. Campaign contribution data is not available for all
interest groups and even when it is, many interest groups provide support to political parties non-
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financially, through other forms of activism. This study could more clearly evaluate the
relationship between political parties and interest groups with a better understanding of how
influential each interest group is to each political party.
Another weakness in evaluating interest groups was specific to some of the Democratic
Party’s core interest groups: ethnic advocacy groups. Ethnic advocacy groups served as a
somewhat problematic variable because their interests were identical to a large portion of the
electorate’s interests due to the advocacy groups’ inherent missions to represent their peoples’
interests. That is, when the electorate’s interests shifted, ethnic advocacy groups’ interests
shifted identically. This made it difficult to decipher whether the Democratic Party was catering
to either the electorate or core interest groups. Thankfully, in this study, MALDEF and the
NAACP did not have identical interests since the NAACP is generally more concerned with
domestic labor than MALDEF. This provided some differentiation in the Democratic Party’s
motives.
Dependent Variable: Political Party Immigration Policy Stances
To measure this study’s dependent variable, political parties’ immigration policy stances,
party platforms were analyzed for each case study. Given this study’s goal, to examine political
parties’ adherence to interest group and electorate interests, party platforms are useful because
they explicitly announce the party’s support or opposition to ideologies and policy proposals.
One weakness of using party platform to evaluate political parties’ policy stances is the
fact that platforms are only published in Presidential election years. For this study, this limits the
ability to evaluate parties’ stances during periods between elections. For example, in the 2004
case study, the parties’ immigration policy stances were evaluated from the 2004 party
platforms, but immigration reform efforts took place mostly in 2006 and 2007.
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Another weakness of party platforms is the lack of exposure platforms receive. Most
voters do not thoroughly examine each party’s platform prior to voting, so parties’ incentive to
publish their most accurate stances may be limited.
Conditional Variable: Immigration’s Political Salience
To measure this study’s conditional variable, immigration’s political salience, national
polling concerning “the nation’s most important problem” was examined. This was a successful
methodology, although throughout the research process, it became clear that national salience
does not provide a complete understanding of whether an issue is politically salient. In the 2004
case study, for example, immigration was not found to be nationally salient. However, within
the socially conservative portion of the Republican Party’s base, immigration was immensely
salient. It is important for future studies to consider numerous voter subsets’ issue prioritization,
not only the issue’s salience on a national scale.
Immigration Policy Framework
Using immigration policy reform as a framework to apply Bawn et. al’s theory of
political parties presented both benefits and weaknesses to this study. The main weakness in
using immigration policymaking as a framework is the “strange bedfellow coalitions” that divide
traditional partisan coalitions when debating immigration policy reform. For example, the
Republican Party’s core interest groups, business and the socially conservative are usually in
agreement on issues of governance. However, in regard to immigration policy, the business
community thrives off of immigrant labor and encourages welcoming immigration policies,
while the socially conservative often take stringent positions concerning the enforcement of law
and order that restrict immigration and immigrants’ ability to work and live in the country.
These “strange bedfellow coalitions” place political parties into a difficult position, forcing them
to either choose to support some, but not other interest groups’ interests, or to toe the line of
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compromise between interest groups. To avoid dismissing any interest group’s interests, parties
may make vague claims regarding immigration policy. Such vague party policy positions make
it difficult to understand parties’ true policy stances.
“Strange bedfellow coalitions” were also beneficial to this study’s analyses. Amid
immigration’s heightened political salience, when Bawn et. al predicts a decreasing “electoral
blind spot,” parties are pressured to articulate concrete policy positions. When parties’ policy
positions become more clear, it is easier to evaluate parties’ loyalty to interest groups versus the
electorate. Since “strange bedfellow coalitions” split parties’ bases, parties are bound to favor
one portion of their base’s interests over another when establishing concrete policy preferences.
If Bawn et. al’s model applies well, parties ought to favor the portion of their base that is more
electorally influential. For instance, in the 2016 case study, immigration was considered
nationally salient. However, the Republican Party’s policy proposals undoubtedly favored the
socially conservative portion of their base over the business community portion. This makes
sense according to Bawn et. al’s model considering the socially conservative electorate’s known
ability to organize electorally to advance their interests concerning immigration.
Implications for Future Work
For studies like this one, which applies Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to cases
of immigration policymaking, it may be beneficial to simultaneously apply Bawn et. al’s theory
to a supplemental policymaking issue besides immigration. Immigration’s “strange bedfellow
coalitions” create non-traditional policymaking adversaries and allies, often splitting parties’
core bases. Simultaneously examining a policymaking issue that promotes more traditionally
partisan coalitions may promote a better understanding for parties’ motives in immigration
policymaking.

For instance, in the case of immigration policymaking, parties sometime
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resorted to vague immigration policy stances in order to appease their divided base. If contrasted
against another issue, parties’ motives may become clearer depending on how parties cater to
core interest groups in other policymaking arenas.
Party polarization is another important consideration for future work. As seen in this
study’s 2016 case, each party, amid high political salience, resorted to extreme positions on
opposing sides of the political spectrum. The Republican Party resorted to extreme stances prior
to the Democratic Party in order to appease the grassroots activists of the Party’s socially
conservative base. As pointed out in Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, the
Democratic Party does not have an equivalently radical subsection of their base. When applying
Bawn et. al’s theory, it is important to consider not just national salience, but also issue salience
within voter subsets.
One final consideration for future research concerns racial institutional orders, which are
discussed within chapter two as a framework of understanding for American issues, including
immigration. King and Smith described two competing racial institutional orders within
American policymaking: the white supremacist order and the egalitarian order. Especially
within the context of immigration reform, this framework could be a useful dichotomy to frame
policymaking battles as racial divides become stark, as seen in the 2016 case study regarding
support for specific immigration policy proposals.
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